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REINING IN “KNOCK AND TALK” 
INVESTIGATIONS:  USING MISSOURI v. 
SEIBERT TO CURTAIL AN END-RUN AROUND 
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 
“The quality of a nation’s civilization can be largely measured 
by the methods it uses in the enforcement of its criminal 
law.”1 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Imagine that you are a single mother of three children.2  You are at 
home cleaning up from dinner when there is a knock at the door.  
Answering the knock reveals two police officers, each wearing shirts 
with “Indiana Drug Enforcement” plainly visible.  They ask to come in 
and discuss a situation regarding your oldest son, age fourteen.  Once 
inside the home, the officers tell you that they have received information 
that drugs are being sold out of your home, and they would like to look 
around.  You begin to sweat, unsure of what to do.3  So you nervously 
ask what they are looking for, and the officers reply that they want to 
look for drugs, drug paraphernalia, or other indications that drugs are 
being sold.  You decline their request for consent to search. 
At this point the officers have a curious look on their faces.  They ask 
you why you would not agree to let them search for these items.  Surely 
you do not want your son selling drugs, and would want to correct any 
missteps he takes right away.  Alternatively, the officers hypothesize, 
maybe you have something to hide.  Is that it?  Already nervous, you are 
now in a state of near hysteria.  Two police officers, with the power to 
                                                 
1 Chief Justice Warren made this statement in the majority opinion of Miranda v. 
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 480 (1966) (quoting Walter V. Shaefer, Federalism and State Criminal 
Procedure, 70 HARV. L. REV. 1, 26 (1956)). 
2 This situation, while completely hypothetical, is a conglomeration of many different 
fact patterns experienced during a summer spent clerking for the Honorable Dean A. 
Colvin, Judge, Marshall County (Indiana) Superior Court #2.  He is, without doubt, one of 
the best legal mentors a law student could ask for.  No inferences should be made that this 
particular fact pattern actually happened, or regarding how Judge Colvin would rule 
should this issue arise in the future. 
3 Before this is casually dismissed as a dilemma facing someone with something to 
hide, see Marcy Strauss, Reconstructing Consent, 92 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 211, 249-50 
(2002).  Strauss, a criminal procedure professor who knew what her rights were, felt 
intimidated, nervous, and embarrassed when police came to her home to investigate her 
son’s party.  Id.  (emphasis added).  She revealed that the police showed no force, yet, 
initially, she was unsure how she should proceed.  Id. 
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arrest you and remove your children, have accused you of hiding 
something.  You are unable to answer, so you just stare at them. 
In response to your silence, the officers tell you that unless you agree 
to let them search, they will remove all three of your children from your 
home and take them to Child Protective Services.  So you agree to let 
them search; they produce a consent form and you sign it.   
The police in this hypothetical have engaged in what is known as a 
“knock and talk,” a procedure that is quickly becoming a popular 
investigatory tool in the police arsenal.4  The police in this hypothetical 
would not have been able to get a search warrant to search the home, yet 
were able to exploit the situation in the home to get around the warrant 
requirement by obtaining the consent of the homeowner.5 
This Note will argue that when the “knock and talk” is used in this 
manner, any fruits, or evidence obtained from the resulting search 
should be excluded as coming from the “poisonous tree,” or illegal 
search.6  First, in Part II, this Note discusses the development of the 
                                                 
4 The “knock and talk” is a tool used in police investigations where the police approach 
a dwelling, without a search warrant, knock on the door, identify themselves as police 
officers, ask to enter the home to “discuss” some police issue, and conduct a search of the 
home after gaining the homeowner’s consent.  Carrie Leonetti, Open Fields in the Inner City: 
Application of the Curtilage Doctrine to Urban and Suburban Areas, 15 GEO. MASON U. CIV. RTS. 
L.J. 297, 311-12 (2005).  These techniques were designed by police to conduct searches 
without warrants and to generally avoid the protections offered by the Fourth 
Amendment.  Id.  See infra note 14 for the appropriate text of the Fourth Amendment.  The 
“knock and talk” technique (no warrant present) is to be distinguished from “knock and 
announce,” which refers to situations where the police already have a search warrant and are 
serving that warrant on the homeowner.  See generally Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385 
(1997) (law enforcement does not even have to “knock” or “announce” in this circumstance 
if the officer has reasonable suspicion, based on articulable facts, that knocking and 
announcing would be dangerous or futile or lead to the destruction of evidence). 
5 Consent is not the only way a search can be conducted without a waiver.  See JOSHUA 
DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL PROCEDURE §§ 11.01-17.01, at 183-275 (3rd ed. 2002).  
There are currently six exceptions (including consent) to the warrant requirement, and to 
be valid, a warrantless search must meet all criteria of one of the exceptions.  Id.  Besides 
consent, the other exceptions are: (1) search incident to a lawful arrest, (2) probable cause to 
believe an automobile contains contraband or evidence of a crime, (3) evidence in plain 
view, (4) a “stop and frisk” search, and (5) hot pursuit, evanescent evidence, or other 
emergency.  Id.  These exceptions are beyond the scope of this Note, and as such, detailed 
explanations are foregone.  However, for an excellent explanation of warrant exceptions, 
see 4 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE 4TH AMENDMENT (West 4th 
ed. 2004) (1978). 
6 Generally, evidence that law enforcement obtains illegally is inadmissible at criminal 
trial.  Further, all evidence obtained or derived by exploiting the illegally obtained 
evidence is inadmissible as well.  Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488 (1963).  In 
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“knock and talk” and the historical roots of consent searches.7  Then, 
because the evolution of consent law relies on confession law, Part II 
traces the development of the Miranda decision and its progeny.8  Part II 
concludes with a discussion of the Missouri v. Seibert decision, which 
forms one basis for the analysis portion of this Note.9  Then, Part III 
presents an analysis of the “knock and talk” using the information 
presented in Part II, while Part IV proposes a workable solution to 
constitutional issues discussed in Part III.10 
II.  THE DEVELOPMENT OF CONSENT LAW—DOES NO REALLY MEAN NO?  
Prior to 1991, no appellate case had ever used the phrase “knock and 
talk” in connection with the consensual search of a home.11  But since 
1991, the increased use of the phrase has corresponded to the increased 
use of the technique, because police find that getting consent is far easier 
than obtaining a search warrant.12  Indeed, excluding searches 
subsequent to arrest, over ninety percent of searches conducted by police 
without a warrant are conducted under the auspices of consent.13  
                                                                                                             
the proceeding, the illegally obtained evidence is the “poisonous tree,” and the evidence 
obtained by exploiting that evidence is the “fruit.”  Id. 
7 See infra notes 18-95 and accompanying text. 
8 See infra notes 96-133 and accompanying text. 
9 See infra notes 134-67 and accompanying text. 
10 See infra notes 168-266 and accompanying text. 
11 H. Morley Swingle & Kevin M. Zoellner, “Knock and Talk” Consent Searches: If Called by 
a Panther, Don’t Anther, 55 J. MO. B. 25 (1999).  Swingle and Zoellner found that the first 
appellate case to mention the phrase was State v. Land, 806 P.2d 1156, 1156 n.4 (Or. App. 
1991).  Further, the police are able to approach the home because that area is outside of the 
curtilage of the home in an area called the open field.  See generally Hester v. United States, 
265 U.S. 57 (1924) (the evaluation of this policy is outside the scope of this Note, and the 
propriety of such will be left to other Notewriters). 
12 See DRESSLER, supra note 5, § 17.01, at 275 (citing RICHARD VAN DUIZEND, L. PAUL 
SUTTON, & CHARLOTTE A. CARTER, THE SEARCH WARRANT PROCESS: PRECONCEPTIONS, 
PERCEPTIONS, AND PRACTICES 21 (Nat’l Center for State Courts 1984)) (quoting a police 
officer frustrated by delays in getting a search warrant: “you say to yourself, ‘my God, you 
know, if I’m putting you [the magistrate] out, you know, I’ll run back to the house and try 
bargaining for consent, you know, ‘cause I can get that done.’”) (emphasis added). 
13 See Ric Simmons, Not “Voluntary” but Still Reasonable: A New Paradigm for 
Understanding the Consent Searches Doctrine, 80 IND. L.J. 773 (2005); Rebecca Strauss, Note, 
We Can Do this the Easy Way or the Hard Way: The Use of Deceit to Induce Consent Searches, 100 
MICH. L. REV. 868, 871 (2002); see also State v. Kerwick, 512 So. 2d. 347, 349 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1987) (reporting testimony of officer patrolling the Amtrak station that they would 
routinely search over 3,000 passenger bags per year after receiving consent); Harris v. State, 
994 S.W.2d 927, 932 n.1 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (noting the police officer in the case asked 
for consent to search every car he stopped, regardless of suspicion).  Searches after arrests 
are beyond the scope of this Note. 
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However, an unreasonable search of a home is the chief problem the 
Fourth Amendment seeks to eradicate.14 
This part will begin by discussing the development of the sub-
category of consent searches known as “knock and talk.”15  Second, the 
legal history and development of consent searches is discussed, ending 
with a discussion of the seminal case Schneckloth v. Bustamonte.16  Third, 
because the Bustamonte Court leaned on the development of voluntary 
confession law, Part III delves into the history of voluntary confession 
cases, concluding with a discussion of the 2004 Supreme Court decision 
in Missouri v. Seibert. 17 
A. Knock and Talk Investigations 
The typical “knock and talk” practice consists of officers knocking on 
a resident’s door, identifying themselves, and requesting entry.18  
                                                 
14 The text of the Fourth Amendment reads: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, 
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, 
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the 
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see, e.g., Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 191 (1990) (Marshall, J., 
dissenting).  Justice Marshall recognized that “physical entry of the home is the chief evil 
against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed.”  Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 
191 (quoting United States v. U.S. Dist. Court, East. Dist. Mich., 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972)); see 
also Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 585 (1980) (quoting same); McDonald v. United 
States, 335 U.S. 451, 455-56 (1948) (holding the right of privacy was deemed too precious to 
entrust to the discretion of those whose job is the detection of crime and the arrest of 
criminals); Hadl v. State, 47 S.W.3d 897, 902 (Ark. App. 2001) (“Indeed, physical intrusion 
into the privacy of a person’s residence absent a warrant is the primary evil that the Fourth 
Amendment seeks to eradicate.”); Leonetti, supra note 4, at 297 (“The sanctity of the home 
and its immediate surroundings enjoys special solicitude in Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence.”). 
15 See infra notes 18-39 and accompanying text. 
16 412 U.S. 218 (1973); see infra notes 40-95 and accompanying text. 
17 124 S. Ct. 2601 (2004); see infra notes 96-167 and accompanying text. 
18 See Leonetti, supra note 4, at 311.  This action alone is constitutional as a result of the 
combination of the curtilege and open fields doctrines.  The curtilege of the home is the 
area immediately surrounding the home, the boundaries of which are usually clearly 
marked, in which the homeowner maintains an expectation of privacy.  See Oliver v. 
United States, 466 U.S. 170, 182 (1984).  Open fields, on the other hand, are the unoccupied 
and undeveloped area outside of the curtilege.  Id. at 178.  Generally, the Court looks at 
four factors when analyzing whether an area is in the curtilege or in an open field.  See 
United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 301 (1987).  Those four factors are: (1) the proximity of 
the area to the home; (2) whether the area was within an enclosure surrounding the home; 
(3) the nature of the uses to which the area was put; and (4) the steps taken to protect the 
area from observation by passers-by.  Id.  But cf. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949) 
(discussing the knock at the door, either during the day or at night, as a prelude to a search 
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Usually, the officers are responding to an informant’s tip that there may 
be drug activity at the house.19  Once inside, the officers inform the 
resident that they are investigating suspected drug activity at the house 
and ask for permission to search the home.20  If permission is granted, 
the officers search the home and can seize potential evidence found 
under the plain view doctrine; officers are authorized to take 
incriminating evidence in their plain view.21   
At the federal level, the “knock and talk” technique has been 
generally recognized as a legitimate police method to obtain consent to 
search a residence.22  However, some federal courts have asked whether 
the police conduct has resulted in a “seizure” for Fourth Amendment 
purposes.23  They focus on whether the occupant of the home would feel 
free to leave the home or otherwise end the encounter.24  These courts, 
generally disapproving of the technique, focus on the inherent 
                                                                                                             
simply on the authority of the police as being inconsistent with “the basic constitutional 
documents of English-speaking peoples”). 
19 See Leonetti, supra note 4, at 312 (“The knock-and-talk has become extremely popular 
with law enforcement agencies around the country, particularly in areas of high drug 
activity.”).  However, nothing prevents the police from engaging in this activity on a whim, 
something that has been held a violation of the Fourth Amendment.  See Wolf, 338 U.S. at 27 
(“The security of one’s privacy against arbitrary intrusion by the police—which is at the 
core of the Fourth Amendment—is basic to a free society.”). 
20 See Swingle & Zoellner, supra note 11, at 25.  This Note focuses on the events 
surrounding this request.  Actual experience indicates that evidence obtained as a result of 
the consent search often is admissible at trial as courts tend to side with law enforcement.  
See LAFAVE, supra note 5, at 51. 
21 See Swingle & Zoellner, supra note 11, at 312.  The plain view doctrine is explained 
merely by stating that an officer, legally present at the scene, may seize incriminating 
evidence if it is in the officer’s plain view, including items not stated in the request for 
consent.  See LAFAVE, supra note 5, at 35. 
22 See United States v. Jones, 239 F.3d 716 (5th Cir. 2001); United States v. Johnson, 170 
F.3d 708 (7th Cir. 1999); United States v. Powell, 929 F. Supp. 231, 232 (S.D. W. Va. 1996) 
(noting while the potential for abuse is apparent, courts and commentators appear to 
concur the practice can be lawful); United States v. Cruz, 838 F. Supp. 535, 543 (D. Utah 
1993) (stating the “knock and talk” approach has been favorably recognized as a manner of 
consent search). 
23 Leonetti, supra note 4, at 313; see, e.g., Johnson, 170 F.3d at 720 (holding that a “knock 
and talk” is unconstitutional because the officers detained the suspect without the 
reasonable suspicion necessary to justify an investigative stop); United States v. Jerez, 108 
F.3d 684, 690 (7th Cir. 1997) (stating that the officers’ conduct amounted to a seizure based 
on the Bostick standard). 
24 This is known at the “free to leave” test.  Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429 (1991).  The 
test holds that when a person is confronted by the police in a confined place, with restricted 
freedom of movement, the appropriate inquiry for determining whether the encounter 
constitutes a “seizure” is whether a reasonable person would feel free to decline the request 
or otherwise end the encounter.  Id. at 436.  See infra notes 80-95 for a discussion of the 
Bostick case. 
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intimidation involved when multiple police officers approach a 
residence late at night seeking a consent search.25  These circumstances 
invariably convey the message to the homeowner that if consent is not 
given, the police officers will simply get a warrant and return.26 
By contrast, in state courts, “knock and talk” jurisprudence has 
generally developed under one of two theories.27  The majority of states 
place no further encumbrances on the technique, choosing to strictly 
analyze the consent granted after police have entered the home.28  The 
courts reason that the validity of “knock and talk” ultimately turns on 
the validity of the consent granted to the searching police officer.29 
Alternatively, some states have analyzed the procedure under 
Fourth Amendment seizure law.30  This analysis has also led to the 
technique being upheld.31  The courts reason that the resident is free to 
end the encounter at any time, and therefore no “seizure” has taken 
place.  These courts analogize the “knock and talk” to the “free to leave 
test.”32 
                                                 
25 Leonetti, supra note 4, at 314. 
26 See, e.g., Griffin v. State, 67 S.W.3d 582 (Ark. 2002) (Brown, J., concurring).  For federal 
cases and the circumstances disallowing the “knock and talk,” see Johnson, 170 F.3d at 720 
(declaring the “knock and talk” unconstitutional when officers detained the suspect 
without the reasonable suspicion necessary to justify an investigatory stop); United States 
v. Conner, 127 F.3d 663 (8th Cir. 1997) (holding consent was not voluntary when it was 
given in response to a “knock and talk” procedure in which four police officers knocked on 
defendant’s motel room door, identified themselves as police, and ordered defendant to 
“Open up”); and Jerez, 108 F.3d at 690 (stating that the officers’ conduct in engaging in a 
late night “knock and talk” amounted to a seizure under the Bostick standard). 
27 See generally Swingle & Zoellner, supra note 11, at 28. 
28 See Hadl v. State, 47 S.W.3d 897, 898 (Ark. App. 2001) (ruling the “knock and talk” 
procedure meets the requirements of the Arkansas Constitution); State v. Green, 598 So. 2d 
624 (La. App. 3rd Cir. 1992) (declaring the “knock and talk” search is not unlawful); People 
v. Frohriep, 637 N.W.2d 562, 569 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992) (analyzing the search resulting from 
a “knock and talk” under consent’s totality of the circumstances). 
29 State v. Land, 806 P.2d 1156 (Or. App. 1991) (upholding a “knock and talk” search 
based on consent jurisprudence). 
30 See Frohriep, 637 N.W.2d at 567 (noting that for any “knock and talk” to have 
constitutional ramifications a search or seizure must have taken place). 
31 See State v. Smith, 488 S.E.2d 210, 214 (N.C. 1997) (holding that the “knock and talk” 
procedure does not taint the consent or render the procedure a per se violation of the 
Fourth Amendment). 
32 The “free to leave test” comes from a Fourth Amendment seizure case, United States v. 
Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980), which declared that a person is seized under the 
Fourth Amendment only if, in view of all the circumstances, “a reasonable person would 
have believed that he was not free to leave.” 
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Conversely, other states have chosen to place additional burdens on 
the police by requiring them to inform the consenter of his right to refuse 
consent.33  These states override Bustamonte, which ruled that police are 
not required to give notice of the occupant’s right to refuse the search on 
state constitutional grounds.34  Courts in these states have placed 
additional burdens on police attempting to search homes, reasoning that 
the home is to be afforded additional protections from search and 
seizure by police under their state constitutions due to the sanctity of the 
home.35 
A case that illustrates this principle is Washington v. Ferrier.36  In 
Ferrier, the Washington Supreme Court held that before a signed consent 
form will be upheld, the police engaging in a “knock and talk” must 
notify a resident of her right to refuse to consent to the search.37  The fact 
that the search took place in the home was central to the court’s analysis 
of the consent granted in this case, and led the court to determine that 
the “knock and talk” is inherently coercive to some degree.38  Therefore, 
                                                 
33 See Graves v. State, 708 So. 2d 858 (Miss. 1997) (stating consent gained through the use 
of a “knock and talk” requires informed waiver); State v. Johnson, 346 A.2d 66, 68 (N.J. 
1975) (ruling that the New Jersey Constitution required the police to inform the resident of 
the right to refuse a search before consent was a valid exception to the warrant 
requirement).  See infra notes 36-39 for a discussion of State v. Ferrier. 
34 See State v. Ferrier, 960 P.2d 927, 932-33 (Wash. 1998) (“we conclude that the knock 
and talk, as carried out here, violated Ferrier’s state constitutional right to privacy in her 
home”).  See infra notes 68-79 for the discussion of Bustamonte. 
35 See Ferrier, 960 P.2d at 933 (stating the fact that the “knock and talk” took place in the 
home was central to their analysis).  Two examples from Ferrier and Johnson can be given.  
The pertinent text of Washington’s Constitution reads: “No person shall be disturbed in his 
private affairs, or his home invaded, without authority of law.”  WASH. CONST. art. 1 § 7.  
The pertinent text of the New Jersey Constitution reads as follows: “The right of the people 
to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and 
seizures, shall not be violated . . . .”  N.J. CONST. art. I, para. 7. 
36 Ferrier, 960 P.2d at 927.  In Ferrier, police went to search Mrs. Ferrier’s house after they 
received a tip from her son that she was growing marijuana in the home.  Id. at 928.  A total 
of four officers of the Bremerton police force went to the home to engage in a “knock and 
talk” because they did not believe they could get a search warrant.  Id.  The officers went to 
Mrs. Ferrier’s home and asked to enter to discuss a problem with her son.  Id.  After the 
officers were in the home they asked for consent to search.  Id.  At this point the testimony 
of the officers differed significantly from the testimony of Mrs. Ferrier.  Id.  The officers 
testified they went over a consent to search form and that Mrs. Ferrier signed it willingly.  
Id. at 929.  They did note, however, that she appeared nervous.  Id.  Mrs. Ferrier, on the 
other hand, testified that the officers threatened to take her grandchildren to protective 
services and that she only signed the consent form to prevent this from happening.  Id.  
Mrs. Ferrier testified that not only was she nervous, she was afraid as well.  Id. 
37 Id. at 938.  The court went on to state that where police have ample opportunity to 
obtain a warrant they would not look kindly on a failure to do so.  Id. at 932. 
38 Id. at 933.  The court stated that in its opinion, the majority of people would not 
question the lack of warrant because they either: (1) do not know one is required, (2) would 
Waite: Reining in "Knock and Talk" Investigations:  Using Missouri v. Se
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2007
1342 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41 
the closer officers come to intruding a dwelling, the greater the 
constitutional protection the Washington Constitution offers.39 
B. The Consent Search—“Bargained” for or Freely Given?  
The United States Supreme Court has often maintained that 
warrantless searches are per se unreasonable.40  However, a significant 
exception to the warrant requirement is the consent search.41  In fact, 
there are few areas of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence that have 
greater practical significance than consent searches.42  One particularly 
troublesome aspect of consent law is how far the Supreme Court has 
been willing to bend to allow police to conduct warrantless activity.43  
This penchant is particularly bothersome when it comes to searches of a 
residence, because the police tend to violate the sanctity of the home that 
the Fourth Amendment ostensibly protects.44  
                                                                                                             
feel inhibited from requesting, or (3) would be too stunned by the circumstances to make a 
reasoned decision on whether to grant consent.  Id. 
39 Id. at 931.  The court stated that in no area is a citizen more entitled to privacy than in 
the home.  Id. 
40 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) (stating, “searches conducted outside 
the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable 
under the Fourth Amendment—subject only to a few specifically established and well-
delineated exceptions”). 
41 See DRESSLER, supra note 5, § 17.01, at 275.  As one officer explained, “there are a lot of 
warrants that are not sought because of the hassle.  You just figure it’s not worth the 
hassle . . . .  I don’t think you can forego a case because of the hassle of a search warrant, 
but you can . . . work some other method.  If I can get consent [to search], I’m gonna do it.”  
VAN DUIZEND, SUTTON, & CARTER, supra note 12, at 21 (quoting DRESSLER, supra note 5, 
§ 17.01, at 275). 
42 See DRESSLER, supra note 5, § 17.06, at 276 (stating a potentially troubling aspect of the 
development of consent law is how far the Court is willing to bend to allow warrantless 
consent searches); see also LAWRENCE M. SOLAN & PETER M. TIERSMA, SPEAKING OF CRIME: 
THE LANGUAGE OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 47-48 (2005) (describing the apparent double standard 
courts employ when analyzing consent in the search context—positing pragmatic 
information indicating consent is credited while pragmatic information indicating coercion 
is discounted). 
43 DRESSLER, supra note 5, § 17.06, at 276.  A particularly pragmatic issue is how often 
people grant consent even though they are well aware that incriminating evidence is 
within the area to be searched.  Strauss, supra note 3, at 212.  Most reasonable people, it 
would seem, would not consent to such a search.  Id.  Indeed, the District of Columbia 
Circuit even had a rule—the no sane man rule—that stated that no sane man who denies 
his guilt would actually be willing to allow policemen to search his room and discover 
contraband.  Higgins v. United States, 209 F.2d 819, 820 (D.C. Cir. 1954) (holding that mere 
acquiescence to a police search, absent some verbal indication to consent, does not 
constitute consent when the resident is denying guilt). 
44 See United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 184 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“The 
right of officers to thrust themselves into a home is also a grave concern, not only to the 
individual but to a society which chooses to dwell in reasonable security and freedom from 
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Despite the sanctity issue, the Court has maintained that the consent 
search may be the only tool that police have when probable cause is not 
present, and even when probable cause is present, the consent search 
may be to the benefit of the person granting consent.45  Further, it may be 
more convenient for the police to conduct a consent search if the suspect 
is willing to give up her constitutional protections.46  However, when the 
police have probable cause, some members of the Court have stated that 
the Constitution prefers the input of a detached and neutral magistrate.47  
In these cases, the methods the courts use to analyze consent become 
                                                                                                             
surveillance.”); Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 307 (1958) (stating that for Fourth 
Amendment purposes a man’s home is his castle); State v. Ferrier, 960 P.2d 927, 931 (Wash. 
1998) (“In no area is a citizen more entitled to his privacy than in his or her home.” 
(quoting State v. Young, 867 P.2d 593, 599 (Wash. 1994) (citation omitted))); Hadl v. State, 
47 S.W.3d 897, 902 (Ark. App. 2001) (“individuals have a high expectation of privacy in 
their homes”).  Indeed, when the search is of the home, and occurs at night, it can be 
particularly problematic.  See Leonetti, supra note 4, at note 60 (citing cases that note the 
consistent recognition of nighttime searches of one’s home as “uniquely intrusive” and 
people being awakened at night by police as “uniquely vulnerable to coercion”).  For this 
reason, the Federal Government, and many states, require more than probable cause to 
justify serving a search warrant on a dwelling at nighttime.  Id. (citing Gooding v. United 
States, 416 U.S. 430, 437 (1974), for the proposition that the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure require positive certainty that the property is on the person or in the place to be 
searched before a nighttime search will be authorized, with the exception of a search for 
controlled substances). 
45 The Court’s attitude toward consent searches was explained by Justice Stewart in 
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973). 
In situations where the police have some evidence of illicit activity, but 
lack probable cause to arrest or search, a search authorized by a valid 
consent may be the only means of obtaining important and reliable 
evidence. . . . And in those cases where there is probable cause to arrest 
or search, but where the police lack a warrant, a consent search may 
still be valuable.  If the search is conducted and proves fruitless, that in 
itself may convince the police that an arrest with its possible stigma 
and embarrassment is unnecessary, or that a far more extensive search 
pursuant to a warrant is not justified.  In short, a search pursuant to 
consent . . . is a constitutionally permissible and wholly legitimate 
aspect of effective police activity. 
Id. at 227-28. 
46 DRESSLER, supra note 5, § 17.02, at 278.  Dressler, however, also delivers a cautionary 
rhetorical question regarding this justification: is police convenience, or police efficiency, 
really important enough that we are willing to cast aside constitutional protections to 
afford it?  Id. 
47 See Matlock, 415 U.S. at 180-81 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“The intervention of a judicial 
officer gives the Amendment vitality by restraining unnecessary and unjustified searches 
and invasions of privacy before they occur.”); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) 
(“[T]he Constitution requires ‘that the deliberate, impartial judgment of a judicial 
officer . . . be interposed between the citizen and the police . . . .’” (quoting Wong Sun v. 
United States, 371 U.S 471, 481 (1963))). 
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very important.48  Traditionally, the Court has used two options:  either 
the consent represents waiver of a constitutional right or the consent 
search is a reasonable search. 
1. Constitutional Waiver or Reasonable Search? 
Early consent cases indicated that the Supreme Court justified 
consent searches on waiver grounds.49  That is, there was no exception to 
the Fourth Amendment, but rather, a consenting person gives up the 
right to be free from unreasonable searches.50  In this way, a person is 
really giving up the claim that her rights were violated when she 
consents to a search.51 
The Court soon moved away from justifying consent searches on 
waiver grounds.  The reasoning behind the waiver grounds soon 
conflicted with the facts surrounding other, Court approved, consent 
cases.52  For example, the waiver of a constitutional right involves the 
“intentional relinquishment of a known right or privilege.”53  However, 
the Court specifically stated in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, discussed in 
detail below, that a consent search can be upheld even if the consenter 
                                                 
48 415 U.S. at 180-81.  Much more bothersome are the cases where police do not have 
consent.  Id.  When the police know they could not obtain a search warrant even if they 
tried, they resort to “bargaining” for consent.  See VAN DUIZEND, SUTTON & CARTER, supra 
note 12, at 21.  This seems to run afoul of the very purpose of the Fourth Amendment itself, 
for “there is nothing new in the realization that the Constitution sometimes insulates the 
criminality of a few in order to protect the privacy of us all.”  Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 
321, 329 (1987). 
49 See DRESSLER, supra note 5, § 17.02, at 277.  For a discussion of the Bustamonte Court’s 
handling of the waiver issue, see infra note 75 and accompanying text. 
50 Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483, 489 (1964) (reasoning that the right to be free of a 
warrantless search “was a right, . . . which only the petitioner could waive by word or 
deed . . . .”); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13 (1948) (holding consent to be invalid if 
it is “granted in submission to authority rather than as an understanding and intentional 
waiver of a constitutional right”). 
51 See DRESSLER, supra note 5, § 17.02, at 277. 
52 Id.  See infra notes 62-65 and accompanying text for a discussion on third party 
consent. 
53 Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938).  Johnson had been imprisoned for 
possessing and passing counterfeit money.  Id. at  460.  He sought a writ of habeas corpus 
to review his claim that he was denied the assistance of counsel at his trial, violating his 
Sixth Amendment rights.  Id.  The District Court Judge denied the writ finding that the lack 
of assistance of counsel did not make the trial void.  Id.  The Supreme Court remanded the 
case for determination whether Johnson intelligently and intentionally waived his 
constitutional right to counsel.  Id. at 469.  The Court further stated that if Johnson did not 
knowingly and intelligently waive his right to counsel the writ must be granted.  Id. 
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did not know that she could refuse the police’s request.54  This conflict is 
further shown in both the cases of third-party consent and the “apparent 
authority” cases.55  Each of these cases involves one party granting 
consent to the police to search the property of someone else, and absent 
some agency relationship, person A cannot waive the constitutional 
rights of person B.56 
Illinois v. Rodriguez states the current justification for consent 
searches.57  In Rodriguez, the Court explained that the consent obtained 
by police made the search reasonable, and therefore no violation of the 
Fourth Amendment occurred.58  As a result, consent is not really a 
                                                 
54 Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973).  The Court reasoned that consent 
searches are a part of standard investigatory techniques, and there was no reason to require 
police to tell the resident they have the right to refuse the request to search.  Id. at 231-32.  
Knowledge of that right by the resident is one of the conditions to be evaluated as a part of 
the “totality of all the circumstances.”  Id. at 227; see also Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33 
(1996) (holding that the Fourth Amendment does not require that a lawfully seized person 
be advised that she is free to go before her consent to a car search will be recognized as 
voluntary, and following the Bustamonte approach in refusing to establish bright line rule).  
This line of reasoning has been followed in the state courts as well.  See State v. Woolfolk, 3 
S.W.3d 823 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999) (ruling state constitution did not require a pre-consent 
warning); State v. Forrester, 541 S.E.2d 837 (S.C. 2001) (holding that the state constitution 
did not require police to issue a warning before the suspect granted consent). 
55 See Mary I. Coombs, Shared Privacy and the Fourth Amendment, or the Rights of 
Relationships, 75 CAL. L. REV. 1593 (1987); Peter Goldberger, Consent, Expectations of Privacy, 
and the Meaning of “Searches” in the Fourth Amendment, 75 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 319 
(1984). 
56 See Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483, 489 (1964) (“It is important to bear in mind that it 
was [Stoner’s] constitutional right which was at stake here . . . .  It was a right, therefore, 
which only [Stoner] could waive by word or deed, either directly or through an agent.”). 
57 497 U.S. 177 (1990).  Rodriguez was arrested for possession of illegal drugs after police 
found cocaine on the coffee table.  Id. at 180.  The police had been summoned to Dorothy 
Jackson’s house to investigate an assault claim by Gail Fischer, Ms. Jackson’s daughter and 
Rodriguez’s girlfriend.  Id. at 179.  Ms. Fischer claimed Rodriguez assaulted her at their 
apartment and that he was at the apartment sleeping.  Id. at 180.  She agreed to take the 
police there and let them in to arrest him.  Id.  She repeatedly referred to the apartment as 
“our” apartment, and stated that she lived there with Rodriguez and had furniture and 
clothes at the apartment.  Id.  Upon arriving at the apartment, Ms. Fischer unlocked the 
door and let the police officers enter.  Id.  The officers then found the cocaine.  Id.  
Subsequently, it was determined that Ms. Fischer did not appear on the lease and did not 
pay rent for the apartment.  Id.  The Court ruled that while Ms. Fischer had no actual 
authority to consent to the search, it could have been reasonable, under the circumstances, 
for the police to assume Ms. Fischer’s authority, and therefore the search itself was 
reasonable and did not violate the Fourth Amendment.  Id. at 189.  The case was remanded 
for consideration of the reasonableness of the police’s presumptions.  Id.  The Court stated 
that the important question was not whether a Fourth Amendment right had been waived, 
but rather, had the right to be free from unreasonable searches been violated.  Id. at 187. 
58 Id. at 183-84.  Some members of the Court in Rodriguez wanted to justify consent 
searches with the logic that once a person has consented to a search, she has given up all 
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warrant exception; if a search is reasonable, it comports with the Fourth 
Amendment by definition.59 
2. Police Deception 
Another consideration in consent searches is the use of deception to 
gain consent.60  In Bumper v. North Carolina, the Supreme Court held that 
a consent search cannot be upheld if the police claim that they already 
have a warrant when, in fact, they do not.61  During the trial the 
prosecutor reported to the judge that there was no warrant, but that 
consent was given to search the home.62  The Court held that the search 
was impermissible, reasoning that mere acquiescence to a claim of 
                                                                                                             
expectations of privacy in the property in question.  See DRESSLER, supra note 5, § 17.02[B], 
at 277.  Under this view, a consent search is really not a search at all.  Id.  The dissent 
claimed, “a person may voluntarily limit his expectation of privacy by allowing others to 
exercise authority over his possessions.”  Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 190 (Marshall, J., with 
whom Brennan and Stevens, JJ., joined, dissenting).  Justice Scalia refuted this statement 
however, by saying: “To describe a consented search as a noninvasion of privacy and thus 
a non-search is strange in the extreme.” Id. at 186 n.*. 
59 DRESSLER, supra note 5, § 17.02, at 278; see also Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 189.  For a further 
discussion on consent searches, see LAFAVE, supra note 5, § 8.  In addition, not only is a 
consent search a “reasonable search,” police only need “reasonable” belief that consent has 
been given.  See United States v. Mendoza-Cepeda, 250 F.3d 626, 629 (8th Cir. 2001) 
(upholding district court’s conclusion that “the Fourth Amendment ‘requires only that the 
police reasonably believe the search to be consensual’”); People v. Henderson, 210 N.E.2d 
483 (Ill. 1965) (reasoning that officers, as reasonable men, could conclude that defendant’s 
consent was given).  However, there are police actions that typically lead courts to a 
finding of involuntariness—threats to a suspect or his family, deprivation of necessities 
until suspect consents, asserting an absolute right to search, and an unusual or extreme 
show of force.  Strauss, supra note 3, at 225; see, e.g., United States v. Ivy, 165 F.3d 397, 402 
(6th Cir. 1998) (stating that the police threat to remove suspect’s child from the home 
amounted to coercion); United States v. Tibbs, 49 F. Supp. 2d 47, 48-49 (D. Mass. 1999) 
(ruling that the removal of suspect’s children was a force rendering suspect’s consent 
coerced). 
60 See LAFAVE, supra note 5, § 8.2, at 55; see also Ivy, 165 F.3d at 402 (ruling that the threat 
to arrest suspect’s girlfriend and remove suspect’s children created coercive environment); 
Tibbs, 49 F. Supp. 2d at 53 (holding that when police threatened to take away the suspect’s 
children they coerced the consent given). 
61 391 U.S. 543, 548 (1968).  Bumper, an African-American man, was charged with raping 
a white woman.  Id. at 544.  Rape was a capital offense in North Carolina at that time.  Id.  
During the search of the home Bumper shared with his grandmother, a .22 caliber rifle was 
found that allegedly was used in the rape.  Id.  Bumper was found guilty and sentenced to 
death.  Id. 
62 Id.  The State attempted to argue that the search was justified based on the fact that it 
turned up the rifle allegedly used.  Id. at 548.  The Court ruled that this issue had been 
settled long ago; a search that violates the constitution is not cured by what it brings to 
light.  Id. 
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authority does not represent consent.63  Further, when an officer claims 
to have authority to search a home under a warrant, he is in effect 
making a claim that the occupant has no right to refuse the search.64  This 
represents coercion on the part of the police, and “where there is 
coercion, there cannot be consent.”65  Additionally, the Court stated that 
consent must be given freely and voluntarily, and placed the burden of 
proving free and voluntary consent on the State.66 
3. Voluntariness of Consent 
Yet another consideration courts must give to consent searches is the 
voluntariness of the consent granted.67  Schneckloth v. Bustamonte is the 
seminal case in determining whether the consent was granted 
voluntarily.68  In Bustamonte, the Supreme Court reversed the Ninth 
                                                 
63 Id.  Bumper lived with his grandmother in a house at the end of an isolated dirt road.  
Id. at 546.  A sheriff, two deputies, and a state investigator went to his house in an attempt 
to search for evidence.  Id.  When the police arrived, they informed Hattie Leath, Bumper’s 
grandmother, that they had a search warrant, and asked to search the home.  Id.  She 
replied “Go ahead.”  Id.  Mrs. Leath testified that she believed the officer that they had a 
warrant, and if the law had a warrant they could search the house.  Id. at 547.  The Court 
stated that consent must be given freely and voluntarily, and that the State had the burden 
of proving consent was indeed given freely and voluntarily.  Id. 
64 Id. at 550.  The Court’s observance of the occupant’s right to refuse the search will 
reappear in later cases.  See infra notes 88-95 and accompanying text for a refining of this 
test in the Bostick and Drayton cases.  See also SOLAN & TIERSMA, supra note 42, at 38-46 
(describing how linguistically police requests can be, and often are, interpreted as 
commands which the accused has no right to refuse). 
65 Bumper, 391 U.S. at 550.  In this case, the Court found that the consent given was 
merely “acquiescence to a claim of lawful authority,” and this was not enough to meet the 
burden imposed on the State to show the consent was given freely and voluntarily.  Id. at 
549. 
66 Id. at 547.  There is question as to whether that burden remains on the prosecution, or 
whether the judiciary has inadvertently shifted that burden to the accused via over-reliance 
on police testimony.  See infra notes 95-102. 
67 See LAFAVE, supra note 5, § 8.2, at 51.  LaFave argues that the voluntariness test is not 
useful.  Id.  He argues that one reason the Miranda decision was made was in response to 
the ineffectiveness of the voluntariness test in the coerced confession arena.  Id.  Actual 
experience evidence often is allowed in at trial.  Id.  Also, courts tend to side with law 
enforcement on questions of voluntariness.  Id.; see also infra note 83 and accompanying 
text. 
68 412 U.S. 218 (1973).  Bustamonte was a passenger in a vehicle that had been stopped 
for having a headlight out.  Id. at 220.  He was sitting on the passenger side of the front seat 
with another man, Alcala.  Id.  The driver could not provide the police officer with 
identification, and Alcala told the officer the car belonged to his brother.  Id.  When the 
police officer asked Alcala if he could search the car Alcala responded, “Sure, go ahead.”  
Id.  No person was threatened with arrest.  Id.  The officer found three checks that had been 
stolen from a local car wash under the front seat of the vehicle.  Id.  Bustamonte was then 
charged with possessing a check with intent to defraud.  Id. at 218.  At the trial court, 
Bustamonte’s motion to suppress the checks was denied and he was convicted.  Id. at 220.  
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Circuit’s finding that consent was a waiver of a constitutional right and 
that the consent granted must be freely and voluntarily given.69  
Engaging in a review of coerced confession cases to establish the 
meaning of voluntariness, the Court noted that the voluntariness of 
confessions was measured by the confessor’s will being overborne, 
which was indicated by a totality of the circumstances.70  Likewise, then, 
consent to search should be a question of fact to be determined by the 
“totality of all the circumstances.”71  Therefore, a person’s awareness, or 
lack of awareness, of her constitutional rights becomes only a factor to be 
considered as a part of the totality of the circumstances surrounding the 
consent given.72  However, in every case involving a consent search, the 
                                                                                                             
He then sought a habeas corpus review in federal district court, and this was denied.  Id. at 
221. 
69 Id. The Court cited Bumper.  See supra notes 60-66 and accompanying text for a 
discussion of the issues surrounding the Bumper case. 
70 Bustamonte, 412 U.S. at 223, 226.  The most extensive exposition of the meaning of 
voluntariness has been in cases of confession.  The Court stated that the need for police 
questioning as a tool for effective enforcement of criminal laws is at one end of a spectrum 
with the belief that unfair and brutal police tactics pose a real and serious threat to civilized 
notions of justice at the other.  Id. at 225.  The Court also noted that “the Constitution 
requires the sacrifice of neither security nor liberty.”  Id.  This test for confessions was 
obviously supplemented by the Miranda case and its progeny.  See infra Part II.C for a 
discussion of the development of confession jurisprudence. 
71 Bustamonte, 412 U.S. at 227.  Many commentators have criticized this holding by the 
Court.  DRESSLER, supra note 5, § 17.03, at 282; see also Strauss, supra note 3, at 872.  These 
critics contend, as did Justice Marshall in dissent, that the Court misstated the issue.  
DRESSLER, supra note 5, § 17.03, at 282-83.  Their contention is that the issue in Bustamonte 
was whether the accused had waived his constitutional right to be free from unreasonable 
searches.  Id. § 17.03, at 283.  Justice Stewart discounted the contention by saying that the 
waiver approach is inconsistent with the Court’s holding in third party consent cases.  
Bustamonte, 412 U.S. at 245.  Those cases hold that any person who possesses common 
authority over premises may consent to a search of the property.  See DRESSLER, supra note 
5, § 17.03, at 283.  The Bustamonte Court stated however that “it is inconceivable that the 
Constitution could countenance the waiver of a defendant’s [constitutional] right . . . by a 
third party.”  Bustamonte, 412 U.S. at 245. 
72 Bustamonte, 412 U.S. at 226.  This decision has been criticized for leading to confusion 
at best and inadequate Fourth Amendment protections at worst.  See Strauss, supra note 3, 
at 235.  The decision has been poorly understood and courts often ignore the factors 
emphasized in Bustamonte.  Id.  It has been posited that people will inevitably feel coerced 
simply by dealing with the police because of their authoritativeness.  Id.  Studies have 
shown that people are significantly more apt to comply with orders they perceive coming 
from an authority figure.  Id. at 238.  A person wearing a guard’s uniforms achieved 82% 
compliance for simple commands such as, move away from a specified area or pick up that 
piece of trash, while a “milkman” achieved 64% compliance, and a civilian achieved 36%.  
Id.  Indeed, some testimony in criminal trials indicates that defendants do not feel they can 
refuse a police request.  Melton v. State, 705 N.E.2d 564, 567 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999).  
Additionally, judges have begun to recognize that citizens might view the request to search 
as a demand if it comes from an authority figure.  Bustamonte, 412 U.S. at 289 (Marshall, J., 
dissenting); State v. Johnson, 346 A.2d 66, 68 (N.J. 1975). 
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prosecution has the burden of demonstrating that the consent, in fact, 
was freely and voluntarily given.73 
The Court reviewed factors generally considered in the totality of all 
the circumstances surrounding confession cases.74  Among the factors 
noted were the age of the accused, intelligence and education level of the 
accused, lack of advisement as to constitutional rights, length of 
detention, use of physical force, repeated and prolonged nature of the 
questioning, and location of the questioning.75  In fact, the majority 
indicated that no single factor would be outcome-determinative, but 
taken together, these factors would be indicative of the totality of all the 
circumstances surrounding the consent.76   
The Court also noted that generally the person giving consent would 
be in the home when granting consent and that the familiar 
surroundings would also play a role in the totality.77  Indeed, the Court 
distinguished Miranda based on this point, stating that Miranda ruled 
that the stationhouse interview is inherently coercive, while the familiar 
surroundings of the home prevented the consent scenario from being 
inherently coercive.78  However, the Court failed to discuss any 
                                                 
73 Bustamonte, 412 U.S. at 222.  The Court stated this was a question of fact to be 
determined by looking at the totality of circumstances.  Id. at 227. 
74 Id. at 226.  See infra notes 80-87 and accompanying text for a review of the Court’s 
treatment of these factors after Bustamonte. 
75 Bustamonte, 412 U.S. at 226.  Again, the factors were settled upon by the Court after the 
review of coerced confession cases with the Court noting these particular factors most often 
were relied upon.  Id. 
76 Id.  “The significant fact about all of these decisions is that none of them turned on the 
presence or absence of a single controlling criterion; each reflected a careful scrutiny of all 
the surrounding circumstances.”  Id. 
77 Id. at 247.  However, this contradicts previous statements describing the sanctity of the 
home being protected by the Fourth Amendment.  Justice Frankfurter summarized the 
view of the sanctity of the home when he stated: 
The security of one’s privacy against arbitrary intrusion by the 
police—which is at the core of the Fourth Amendment—is basic to a 
free society. . . . The knock at the door, whether by day or by night, as a 
prelude to a search, without authority of law but solely on the 
authority of the police, did not need the commentary of recent history 
to be condemned as inconsistent with the conception of human rights 
enshrined in the history and the basic constitutional documents of 
English-speaking peoples. 
Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27-28 (1948); see also supra note 14 and accompanying text. 
78 Wolf, 338 U.S. at 27-28.  Interestingly, the Court did not discuss other cases referencing 
the reverence with which the home is treated.  See supra note 14.  The Court has also 
invoked the issue of privacy in the home in other contexts as well.  Frisby v. Schultz, 487 
U.S. 474 (1988).  Justice O’Connor’s opinion described the targets of picketing as being 
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Congressional or regulatory determinations on this point.  For example, 
the Court never mentioned a Federal Trade Commission regulation that 
specifically deals with coercive sales tactics inside the home.79 
                                                                                                             
literally and figuratively trapped inside their homes.  Id. at 487.  She went on to say that 
even one picketer could “invade residential privacy.” 
79 See 16 C.F.R. § 429.1 (2005).  The pertinent text reads as follows: 
In connection with any door-to-door sale, it constitutes an unfair and 
deceptive act or practice for any seller to: 
(a) Fail to furnish the buyer with a fully completed receipt or copy 
of any contract pertaining to such sale at the time of its execution, 
which is in the same language, e.g., Spanish, as that principally 
used in the oral sales presentation and which shows the date of 
the transaction and contains the name and address of the seller, 
and in immediate proximity to the space reserved in the contract 
for the signature of the buyer or on the front page of the receipt if 
a contract is not used and in bold face type of a minimum size of 
10 points, a statement in substantially the following form: 
“You, the buyer, may cancel this transaction at any 
time prior to midnight of the third business day 
after the date of this transaction. See the 
attachednotice of cancellation form for an 
explanation of this right.” 
The seller may select the method of providing the buyer with the 
duplicate notice of cancellation form set forth in paragraph (b) of this 
section, provided however, that in the event of cancellation the buyer 
must be able to retain a complete copy of the contract or receipt. 
Furthermore, if both forms are not attached to the contract or receipt, 
the seller is required to alter the last sentence in the statement above to 
conform to the actual location of the forms. 
(b) Fail to furnish each buyer, at the time the buyer signs the 
door-to-door sales contract or otherwise agrees to buy consumer 
goods or services from the seller, a completed form in duplicate, 
captioned either “NOTICE OF RIGHT TO CANCEL” or 
“NOTICE OF CANCELLATION,” which shall (where applicable) 
contain in ten point bold face type the following information and 
statements in the same language, e.g., Spanish, as that used in the 
contract. 
Id. 
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4. Voluntariness after Bustamonte 
The Court expanded Bustamonte in Florida v. Bostick.80  The Florida 
Supreme Court held that the police coerced consents to search luggage 
by conducting bus sweeps for drugs, therefore violating the Fourth 
Amendment.81  But the Supreme Court reversed and stated that no per se 
violation of the Fourth Amendment had occurred.82  The Court declared 
that the appropriate test is whether the bus passenger would feel free to 
decline the officers’ requests given the totality of all the circumstances.83 
Since Bostick, the Court has stuck with the “free to end the 
encounter” test, as demonstrated in United States v. Drayton.84  In 
                                                 
80 501 U.S. 429 (1991).  In Bostick, a bus en route from Miami to Atlanta had a stopover in 
Ft. Lauderdale.  Id. at 431.  While the bus was stopped, two officers with badges, insignia, 
and one holding a zipper pouch containing a pistol, boarded the bus in an attempt to curb 
the illegal transportation of drugs.  Id.  The two officers admitted to picking out Bostick for 
no articulable reason.  Id.  The officers asked Bostick for his identification and ticket, and 
immediately returned them after determining they were appropriate.  Id.  The officers 
continued the interrogation, identifying themselves as drug officers and requested 
permission to search Bostick’s belongings.  Id. at 432.  It was the point of contention 
whether this consent took place, and whether this action by the police amounted to a 
seizure for Fourth Amendment purposes.  Id. 
81 Id. at 433.  The Florida Supreme Court reasoned that Bostick would have been seized 
for Fourth Amendment purposes due to the fact a reasonable person would not have felt 
free to leave the bus to avoid the questioning.  State v. Bostick, 554 So. 2d 1153, 1154 (Fla. 
1989) (stating an impermissible seizure results when police engage in drug searches during 
scheduled stops by questioning passengers without an articulable reason for doing so for 
the purpose of gaining consent to search the luggage). 
82 Bostick, 501 U.S. at 440.  The Court was persuaded by several factors.  Id. at 434-40.  
First, the Court noted that police merely asking questions does not constitute a seizure.  Id. 
at 434.  Second, the Court reasoned that if this encounter had taken place after the bus had 
arrived in Atlanta or before it left Miami, there would be no doubt about the legitimacy of 
the encounter.  Id.  Third, the Court stated the fact that Bostick would not have felt free to 
leave the bus was due to his own decision to take the bus, an independent factor from any 
coercive police behavior.  Id. at 436.  As a result of these factors, as well as the trial court’s 
finding that the police had instructed Bostick that he had the right to refuse the search, the 
Court overruled the Florida Supreme Court.  Id. at 440.  However, the Court intentionally 
did not rule whether a seizure had taken place or not.  Id. at 437. 
83 Id. (stating that the case is remanded so that the Florida courts may evaluate the 
seizure question under the correct legal standard). 
84 536 U.S. 194 (2002).  In Drayton, a bus was en route from Ft. Lauderdale to Detroit 
when it made a scheduled stop for gas in Tallahassee.  Id. at 197.  At that time, three police 
officers boarded the bus as part of drug interdiction program.  Id.  One officer observed 
from the driver’s seat, one officer stayed at the rear of the bus, and one officer went up the 
aisle and randomly asked passengers if he could search their bags and/or person.  Id. at 
198.  When the officer got to Drayton and his traveling partner, they both indicated that the 
officer could search their bags in the overhead bin.  Id.  After that search, they each 
consented to the officer patting down their persons, where the officer found bags of cocaine 
taped to their thighs.  Id. at 199.  The Court of Appeals ruled the search and seizure 
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Drayton, another bus search case, the Court stated that when a 
reasonable person would feel free to end the encounter, no seizure has 
taken place, and that the consent is given voluntarily.85  The majority 
paid particular attention to the actions of the police, and never discussed 
the Bustamonte factors surrounding the person granting consent.86  In 
fact, the Court seemed to say that police conduct is more decisive in the 
voluntariness question than subjective factors surrounding the person 
granting consent.87 
However, a general problem that occurs with consent searches, and 
is especially pertinent when considering the “knock and talk,” is that the 
litigation of consent brings the integrity of judicial reviewer into the 
equation.88  Often, the suspect’s version of events will differ dramatically 
from the police officer’s version.89  In these instances, judges tend to side 
with the police; they are uncomfortable accusing the police of lying 
unless the evidence against the officer is overwhelming.90  This deference 
occurs despite the fact that the need to convict, and the need to avoid 
reprimand, creates incentives for the officer to misrepresent the 
circumstances surrounding consent.91  These incentives manifest 
themselves in two potential ways, with the first being outright perjury 
                                                                                                             
unconstitutional, saying passengers on a bus would not feel free to disregard the search 
request.  Id.  However, the Court reversed and remanded the decision.  Id. 
85 Id. at 203-04.  Further, the Court stated that this test presupposes an innocent 
reasonable person.  Id. at 202.  This is also affirmation of the Bostick decision utilizing the 
reasonable innocent person.  Bostick, 501 U.S. at 437-38. 
86 See Simmons, supra note 13, at 779 (stating that in practice the Court will only look at 
police conduct in determining voluntariness); see also Strauss, supra note 3, at 222 (positing 
that the subjectivity requirement of Bustamonte is dead). 
87 A nuanced reading of Bustamonte also supports this contention.  See Simmons, supra 
note 13, at 779.  The Court attempted to make clear that the purpose of the voluntariness 
requirement is to prevent police misconduct, not to ensure the defendant is making a 
subjectively free choice.  Id.  Further, it could be argued that the subjectively free choice is 
irrelevant because the lynchpin of traditional Fourth Amendment jurisprudence is 
reasonableness, or, in other words, an objective inquiry into the appropriateness of police 
action.  Id. at 774. 
88 See Strauss, supra note 3, at 244; see also Simmons, supra note 13, at 775 (“[T]he nearly 
unanimous condemnation of the Court’s rulings on consensual searches is creating a 
problem of legitimacy which threatens to undermine the integrity of judicial review of 
police behavior.”). 
89 Strauss, supra note 3, at 245 (calling these differences “conflicting tales”).  Indeed, the 
author cites as an example “several” students in her Criminal Procedure class report they 
refused consent only to have the officer say “thank you for agreeing,” and then proceed to 
search.  Id. at 246 n.130. 
90 See David S. Kaplan & Lisa Dixon, Coerced Waiver and Coerced Consent, 74 DENV. U. L. 
REV. 941, 947 (1997).  Further, many recognize the accused’s incentive to lie to maintain his 
freedom.  Id. 
91 See Strauss, supra note 3, at 245. 
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by the officer.92  Some believe that judges knowingly accept this perjury 
and purposefully ignore the law to keep evidence from being 
suppressed.93  The second manifestation is selective perception, or 
“misremembering.”94  Either one of these manifestations impacts the 
integrity of the judicial system and the public’s belief in its ability to 
render fair and objective justice.95 
C. Confessions:  Can Police “Bargain” for Confessions? 
Because consent search law, as developed by Bustamonte, relied so 
heavily on coerced confession jurisprudence, a review of confession case 
                                                 
92 Id. at 245-49; see also Myron W. Orfield, Jr., Deterrence, Perjury, and the Heater Factor: An 
Exclusionary Rule in the Chicago Criminal Courts, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 75, 82-83 (1992) 
(reporting a study of prosecuting attorneys, judges, and police officers revealed “pervasive 
police perjury intended to avoid the requirements of the Fourth Amendment”).  One 
former Police Chief admitted his belief that perjury (called “testilying”) is common at 
suppression hearings with respect to consent searches.  Strauss, supra note 3, at 246 
(referring to Morgan Cloud, Judges, “Testilying,” and the Constitution, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 1341, 
1356-57 (1996)); Joseph McNamara, Has the Drug War Created an Officer’s Liars Club?, L.A. 
TIMES, Feb. 11, 1996, at M1. 
[H]undreds of thousands of police officers swear under oath . . . that 
the defendant gave consent to a search.  This may happen occasionally 
but it defies belief that so many drug users are . . . so dumb as to give 
cops consent to search . . . when they possess drugs. 
McNamara, supra, at M1; see also Maurice Possley & Gary Marx, Drug Busts Only as Good as 
Cop’s Word, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 4, 1997, § 1, at 1 (describing study by a member of the 
Minnesota House of Representatives interviewing judges, prosecutors, police officers, 
public defenders  working in the Cook County Criminal Courts and found 64% of judges 
and 84% of public defenders interviewed believed officers shade the facts as much as 
needed to obtain probable cause when there may not have been probable cause); United 
States v. Heath, 58 F.3d 1271, 1276 (8th Cir. 1995) (McMillian, J., concurring) (“The police 
officers’ saccharine account of the events . . . leaves a bitter aftertaste . . . .  The ‘fact’ that 
[defendant] would so willingly consent to the search of . . . the shoe box, which he knew 
contained drugs . . . is surprising, to say the least.”). 
93 See Orfield, supra note 92, at 83.  The reasons for these actions by judges are that the 
judge may feel that it is unjust to suppress the evidence under the circumstances of the 
case, fear of adverse publicity, or worry that a suppression will hurt the chance for re-
election.  Id.  Orfield also noted that serious cases in Chicago are diverted to judges who 
have the reputation of being more likely to convict the defendant.  Id. 
94 See Strauss, supra note 3, at 250.  Selective perception occurs when the suspect grants 
conditional consent, but the officer hears an unqualified yes.  Id. at 249.  As time goes by, 
the words used by the suspect become even more convincingly clear in the officer’s head; 
so much so that, by the time of trial, the officer can honestly take the stand and testify that 
the suspect clearly and without qualification consented.  Id. 
95 Id. at 252.  This is analogous to the testimony regarding the question of whether the 
suspect received and understood his Miranda rights.  See infra note 128.  However, there are 
reasons to believe testimony in the Miranda realm is more reliable—first, the rights are 
often given and received in the more formal setting of the stationhouse, and, second, those 
interrogations are often videotaped.  Id. 
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law is necessary as it also impacts the “knock and talk” analysis.  A 
privilege against compelled self-incrimination in United States 
jurisprudence has existed since the Supreme Court’s decision in Bram v. 
United States.96  This decision held that the Fifth Amendment privilege 
was applicable to federal criminal trials as a matter of constitutional 
law.97  However, because the Court did not find that this right was 
fundamental, it was not applicable to state criminal trials.98 
Because the Fifth Amendment was not available to keep coerced 
confessions out of state criminal trials, the Court often resorted to the 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.99  This clause was the 
instrument of choice for the Supreme Court until Malloy v. Hogan.100  In 
Hogan, the Court held that the Fifth Amendment was now applicable to 
the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, thus ensuring that 
suspects in state criminal trials could assert the Fifth Amendment 
privilege as a basis for excluding a coerced confession.101 
During the period that Hogan was decided, the Court became 
concerned with the interrogation techniques used by law enforcement 
officials.102  The use of the Due Process Clause caused police to move 
from physical force during interrogations to psychological pressures to 
elicit confessions.103  The Court wanted to even the playing field in the 
interrogation room, believing that the police had an unfair advantage 
over suspects.104  This belief, in part, led the Court in Escobedo v. Illinois to 
                                                 
96 168 U.S. 532 (1897) (holding that a confession can never be received into evidence 
when it has been brought about by threats or violence). 
97 Id. at 542.  The pertinent text of the Fifth Amendment: “No person . . . shall be 
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.”  U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
98 See DRESSLER, supra note 5, § 23.01[B][1], at 436. 
99 Michael J. Zydney Mannheimer, Coerced Confessions and the Fourth Amendment, 30 
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 57 (2002).  The pertinent text of the Fourteenth Amendment 
provides: “nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law . . . .”  U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 1. 
100 378 U.S. 1 (1964).  Malloy was arrested during a gambling raid.  Id. at 3.  The Court 
held that the constitutional inquiry is not whether the conduct of state officers in obtaining 
the confession was shocking, but rather was the confession “free and voluntary.”  Id. at 7. 
101 Id. at 3. 
102 See DRESSLER, supra note 5, § 24.02, at 457.  A majority of the Supreme Court viewed 
confessions “darkly as the product of police coercion.”  Id. (quoting Gerald M. Caplan, 
Questioning Miranda, 38 VAND. L. REV. 1417, 1425 (1985)). 
103 Id. 
104 Id.  Coerced confession jurisprudence developed in response to the use of physical 
and psychological coercion to extract statements from criminal suspects.  See Caplan, supra 
note 102, at 1425.  The first case in this line of jurisprudence was Brown v. Mississippi, 297 
U.S. 278 (1936).  In Brown, three African-American suspects were indicted for murder based 
on confessions obtained by torturing the suspects until they agreed to confess.  Id. at 281. 
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declare that the Sixth Amendment extended the right to counsel to the 
interrogation room.105 
To combat the confusion that Escobedo created, the Court chose four 
appeals cases, now treated collectively as Miranda, to announce a 
clarification of suspects’ rights in the interrogation room.106  In Miranda, 
the Court announced a prophylactic rule establishing a conclusive 
presumption that coercion was present if certain warnings were not 
given or a waiver of these rights was not obtained.107  The Court viewed 
the Miranda warnings as a solution to the problem caused by various 
tests being used to determine the “voluntariness” of a suspect’s 
confession.108 
However, the mere issuance of Miranda warnings does not end the 
coercion analysis.109  A court must still go through the coercion analysis 
even if Miranda is followed.110  That being said, coercive police conduct is 
now required if a post warning confession is to be found involuntary.111  
                                                 
105 378 U.S. 478 (1964).  In Escobedo, the Court held that the Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel is violated when a suspect is the focus of an investigation and has requested and is 
denied an opportunity to consult with his lawyer.  Id. at 490-91.  Escobedo had been held 
during a murder investigation and was not allowed to confer with his hired counsel while 
police were questioning him.  Id. at 481.  The police told Escobedo’s attorney he could not 
see Escobedo until they were done with the investigation.  Id.  The interrogation lasted 
overnight, and eventually Escobedo made incriminating statements to the police before he 
was allowed to confer with his attorney.  Id. at 482.  The Court ruled that when Escobedo 
requested the presence of his attorney, the interrogation ceased to be a general inquiry, that 
Escobedo had become the accused, and the purpose of the interrogation was to get him to 
confess his guilt despite the constitutional right not to do so.  Id. at 485.  The Court declared 
the statement inadmissible and overturned the conviction.  Id. at 484. 
106 See DRESSLER, supra note 5, § 24.04, at 460. 
107 See Mannheimer, supra note 99, at 62.  In this setting, the term “prophylactic rule” 
refers to a rule devised by the Court for the purpose of preventing a violation of a 
constitutional right.  DRESSLER, supra note 5, § 4.05, at 73-74.  In this context, the rule means 
that the Miranda warnings must be given to ensure any confession a suspect makes is not 
coerced by law enforcement.  Id. 
108 See Mannheimer, supra note 99, at 70. The test for coercion had been whether the 
suspect’s will was overborne or whether the confession was the product of a rational 
intellect and a free will.  Id.  The standard became whether the confession was voluntary 
under all the circumstances, taking into account the police conduct and the character of the 
confessor.  Id. 
109 Id. at 72. 
110 Id.  This provides a prohibition of coercive police tactics even where Miranda has been 
given.  Id.  In other words, just giving the Miranda warning does not give the police the 
authority to physically or psychologically coerce a confession out of the suspect.  Id.  The 
confession must be the result of the suspect’s free will.  Id. 
111 Id. at 75; see also Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 163-64, 167 (1986) (“[T]he crucial 
element of police [is] overreaching . . . .  Absent police conduct causally related to the 
confession, there is simply no basis for concluding that any state actor has deprived a 
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Given these facts, confusion about the applicability of the Miranda 
warnings was rampant.112  Questions arose regarding the 
constitutionality of the warnings and if a Miranda violation represented a 
constitutional violation.113  Further, if a violation of Miranda was a 
constitutional violation, many wondered if a “fruits” analysis was 
needed for subsequent statements or evidence obtained as a result of the 
unwarned statement.114 
The Court attempted to answer these questions in later cases, 
although scholars are somewhat skeptical of the logic utilized by the 
holdings.115  First, the Court addressed the constitutional issue in 
Michigan v. Tucker,116 stating that the violation of Miranda rules was a 
violation only of prophylactic rules developed to protect the Fifth 
Amendment right.117 
                                                                                                             
criminal defendant of due process of law.”).  However, the prosecution bears the burden of 
proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that a waiver exists and that it was 
voluntarily obtained.  Id. at 169. 
112 See Steven D. Clymer, Are Police Free to Disregard Miranda?, 112 YALE L.J. 447, 449 
(2002).  For example, Clymer argues that police decisions not to use Miranda warnings are 
not, in and of themselves, constitutional violations.  Id. at 450.  Rather, the police only 
violate Miranda if statements are used in court that otherwise should have been 
inadmissible.  Id.  Clymer posits that Miranda warnings only affect the admissibility of a 
suspect’s statement.  Id. 
113 Compare id. at 449-50 (“Miranda is best understood as a constitutional rule of 
admissibility.”), with supra note 99 and accompanying text. 
114 The “fruits” analysis comes from a Fourth Amendment case.  Wong Sun v. United 
States, 371 U.S. 471, 488 (1963); see supra note 6 and accompanying text (explaining “fruit of 
the poisonous tree”).  In Wong Sun, evidence otherwise admissible but obtained as a result 
of an earlier Fourth Amendment violation, the “fruit of the poisonous tree,” is excluded as 
tainted to keep from encouraging future violations.   371 U.S. at 484. 
115 Peter Bowman Rutledge & Nicole L. Angarella, An End of Term Exam: October Term 
2003 at the Supreme Court of the United States, 54 CATH. U. L. REV. 151, 179 (2004) 
(characterizing these decisions as “splintered”); see also The Supreme Court: 2003 Term 
Leading Cases, 118 HARV. L. REV. 306, 311 (2004) (describing decisions as “doctrinally 
incoherent” and “compromise” decisions). 
116 417 U.S. 433 (1974).  In Tucker, the suspect in a rape investigation was not given his 
complete Miranda warnings.  Id. at 435.  During the interrogation the suspect gave a 
statement mentioning the name of someone else who might have been involved in the 
crime.  Id.  The prosecution in Tucker used this person as a witness against the suspect, and 
the issue involved in the case was whether the fruit—the name of the witness divulged in a 
Miranda-less interview—was admissible.  Id. at 436-38. 
117 Id. at 444.  Justice Rehnquist stated: 
A comparison of the facts in this case with the historical circumstances 
underlying the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination 
strongly indicates that the police conduct here did not deprive 
respondent of his privilege against compulsory self-incrimination as 
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But the Tucker decision did little to abate the confusion in the legal 
community.118  For instance, if Miranda was not a constitutional rule, 
then the power of the Court to enforce the rule in state proceedings was 
questionable.119  The Court had the chance to clarify the constitutional 
position of Miranda in two cases, Oregon v. Elstad120 and Dickerson v. 
United States.121  In Elstad, the Court held that a second Mirandized 
statement could be admitted into evidence under certain circumstances 
and was not to be excluded.122  The Court reasoned that if the police 
make errors in administering a prophylactic Miranda procedure, it 
should not be equated with a violation of the Fifth Amendment itself.123  
As a result, this holding followed Tucker’s logic that the Miranda decision 
                                                                                                             
such, but rather failed to make available to him the full measure of 
procedural safeguards associated with that right since Miranda. 
Id. 
118 Id. at 475-76.  This ruling seemed to say that a Miranda violation was not a 
constitutional violation; therefore, there was no “poisonous tree,” or unconstitutional 
action, from which to get fruit.  See DRESSLER, supra note 5, § 24.06, at 475. 
119 DRESSLER, supra note 5, § 24.06, at 475 (citing Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 221 (1982) 
for the proposition that the Supreme Court lacks general supervisory authority over state 
judicial proceedings). 
120 470 U.S. 298 (1985).  In Elstad, the suspect was arrested in his parents’ home.  Id. at 300-
01.  While one of the officers was informing his mother of the circumstances of his arrest, 
the other officer asked the suspect about a burglary next door.  Id.  The suspect responded 
that he was there, and then confessed again during questioning at the station house.  Id.  
The Court ruled that the confession at the station house was voluntary, and came after a 
Miranda warning.  Id. at 315.  Therefore, it was properly admitted into evidence.  Id. at 318.  
The Court discounted the psychological effects of the suspect’s prior confession, instead 
focusing on the voluntariness of each confession, the time interval between them, and the 
change in scenery and interrogators.  Id. at 312-16.  The Court characterized the failure to 
issue a Miranda warning in the suspect’s house as an “oversight.”  Id. at 316. 
121 530 U.S. 428 (2000).  In Dickerson, Dickerson was indicted for bank robbery, conspiracy 
to commit bank robbery, and using a firearm to commit an act of violence, all violations of 
Title 18 of the United States Code.  Id. at 432.  Before trial, Dickerson moved to exclude a 
statement he had made to the local branch office of the FBI on grounds that he did not 
receive his Miranda warnings prior to the interrogation.  Id.  The District Court agreed and 
granted his motion.  Id.  However, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, while 
agreeing that the Miranda warnings were not given, reversed the Disctrict Court.  Id.  The 
Court of Appeals ruled that Miranda was not a constitutional decision and therefore 
Congress could overrule the decision.  Id.  The Court of Appeals went on to hold that the 
voluntariness provisions of § 3501 were met, and therefore, the statement by Dickerson 
should be allowed.  Id.  Congress had responded to the Miranda decision by passing 
legislation stating the voluntariness issue was determinative in the federal context when 
evaluating confessions.  18 U.S.C. § 3501 (2000).  This piece of legislation was declared 
unconstitutional in this decision.  Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 439. 
122 Elstad, 470 U.S. at 312 (“When neither the initial nor the subsequent admission is 
coerced, little justification exists for permitting the highly probative evidence of a voluntary 
confession to be irretrievably lost to the factfinder.”). 
123 Id. at 306 (“The Miranda exclusionary rule, however, serves the Fifth Amendment and 
sweeps more broadly than the Fifth Amendment itself.”). 
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was not a constitutional rule.124  However, in direct contrast, Dickerson 
held that Miranda was a “constitutional decision” and had a 
“constitutional origin.”125  Chief Justice Rehnquist stated in the majority 
opinion that “we conclude that Miranda announced a constitutional rule 
that Congress may not supersede legislatively.”126  As a result, the states 
were bound to enforce Miranda.127 
The Dickerson ruling has been largely described as a decision 
attempting to get to the middle ground of the interrogation debate.128  
The holding has been widely criticized as illogical and Chief Justice 
Rehnquist has been criticized as not adequately distinguishing either 
Elstad or Tucker.129  Even so, it seems clear from these rulings that the 
police do not violate the Constitution by merely refusing to give the 
Miranda warnings or failing to get a waiver of those rights.130  Rather, the 
Fifth Amendment is violated only when the coerced statements are used 
                                                 
124 Id. at 308 (noting that, as in Tucker, “the absence of any coercion or improper tactics 
undercuts the twin rationales—trustworthiness and deterrence—for a broader rule”). 
125 Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 439 (concluding that Miranda presented constitutional guidelines 
for law enforcement to follow, and the statements obtained from the suspect did not meet 
constitutional standards). 
126 Id. at 444. 
127 Id.  The legislation at issue in Dickerson was 18 U.S.C. § 3501, an attempt by Congress 
to overrule Dickerson by reinstituting the voluntariness test in evaluating confessions.  Id. at 
435-46. 
128 See generally Yale Kamisar, A Look Back on a Half-Century of Teaching, Writing and 
Speaking About Criminal Law and Criminal Procedure, 2 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 69 (2004); 
Rutledge & Angarella, supra note 115, at 179 (describing the Dickerson decision as a 
“détente”). 
129 See Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 453 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that in light of the decisions 
in Elstad and Tucker that it is simply no longer possible for the Court to conclude that a 
violation of Miranda’s rules is also a constitutional violation); see also William S. Consovoy, 
The Rehnquist Court and the End of Constitutional Stare Decisis: Casey, Dickerson and the 
Consequences of Pragmatic Adjudication, 2002 UTAH L. REV. 53 (describing the Dickerson 
decision as the end of stare decisis); Joelle Anne Moreno, Faith Based Miranda?: Why the 
New Missouri v. Seibert Police “Bad Faith” Test Is a Terrible Idea, 47 ARIZ. L. REV. 395, 396-97 
(2005) (calling the belief that “Dickerson’s constitutional imprimatur” on Miranda’s rules 
would enhance law enforcement compliance “naive”); The Supreme Court, supra note 115, at 
311 (describing the Dickerson opinion as “doctrinally incoherent but carefully crafted to 
protect culturally entrenched Miranda warnings from congressional attack, all the while 
purporting to preserve Elstad and the other fruits cases”). 
130 See Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760 (2003).  In Chavez, a struggle broke out when 
police attempted to interview suspect Martinez regarding narcotics activity.  Id. at 763.  
During the scuffle, the suspect took the gun out of one officer’s holster.  Id. at 764.  Upon 
seeing this, the other officer shot Martinez several times and placed him under arrest.  Id.  
Officer Chavez, a patrol supervisor, proceeded to interview Martinez while he was getting 
medical treatment at the hospital.  Id.  At no time were the Miranda warnings given to 
Martinez.  Id.  The Court held that because no charges were ever filed against Martinez, 
there was no Fifth Amendment violation.  Id. at 772. 
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against the accused during a trial.131  Police violation of the Miranda rules 
will only affect the subsequent statement’s admissibility.132  It is equally 
clear that a suspect’s issuance of an unwarned statement should not be a 
complete bar to the admissibility of a subsequent statement that the 
suspect might make during a future interrogation after the Miranda 
warnings have been issued.133  
D. The Seibert Decision 
Taking the next logical step, the Court hoped to answer the question 
of admissibility of statements in a “question-first” context, defined as 
interrogating the suspect first and then issuing the Miranda warnings, in 
the case of Missouri v. Seibert.134  In a plurality opinion, the Court 
affirmed the Supreme Court of Missouri’s decision, and held that both 
the pre-warning and post-warning statements by the suspect should 
have been excluded.135  Justice Souter, announcing the decision of the 
                                                 
131 Id. “All the Fifth Amendment forbids is the introduction of coerced statements at 
trial.”  Id.  (quoting New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 686 (1984)); see also Clymer, supra 
112, at 450 (noting that police decisions not to use Miranda are not a constitutional violation 
and that the constitutional violation only occurs when the statement is used at trial). 
132 See Clymer, supra note 112, at 450 (stating the only effect of a violation of Miranda is on 
the statement’s admissibility). 
133 Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 309 (1985). 
It is an unwarranted extension of Miranda to hold that a simple failure 
to administer the warnings, unaccompanied by any actual coercion or 
other circumstances calculated to undermine the suspect’s ability to 
exercise his free will, so taints the investigatory process that a 
subsequent voluntary and informed waiver is ineffective for some 
indeterminate period. 
Id. 
134 124 S. Ct. 2601, 2607 (2004).  Patrice Seibert’s 12 year-old son had cerebral palsy.  Id. at 
2605.  When he died in his sleep, she feared that she would be charged with neglect 
because of bedsores on his body.  Id.  Her two teenage sons and two of their friends 
devised a plan to conceal the facts surrounding the boy’s death by incinerating his body 
during the course of burning the family’s mobile home.  Id.  To avoid the appearance that 
they had left the child unattended, they planned to leave Donald Rector, a mentally ill 
teenager living with the family, in the mobile home while it burned.  Id.  This plan was 
hatched in the presence of Patrice Seibert; her son, Darian, and a friend set fire to the home, 
and Donald died.  Id. at 2606.  Five days later the police arrested Seibert.  Id.  “Question 
first” refers to the police technique of interviewing the suspect, getting a confession, then 
giving her the Miranda warning, and repeating the pre-warning questions.  See infra note 
144 for a description of the use of this technique in Seibert. 
135 Seibert, 124 S. Ct. at 2605.  Officer Kevin Clinton followed instructions from Officer 
Richard Hanrahan that he refrain from giving Miranda warnings.  Id.  Seibert was 
transported to a police station and left in an interrogation room for 15-20 minutes before 
Hanrahan questioned her without giving her Miranda warnings.  Id. at 2606.  During the 
initial interview, Hanrahan questioned Seibert for 30 to 40 minutes and at one point was 
squeezing her arm and repeating “Donald was also to die in his sleep.”  Id.  Seibert finally 
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Court,136 first observed that the goals of Miranda and the question-first 
technique conflict.137  The goal of Miranda is to ensure that interrogation 
practices do not “overbear the will” of the accused and to ensure that the 
accused is aware of the choices the Constitution guarantees.138  Question-
first techniques, on the other hand, are intended to render the Miranda 
warnings ineffective by issuing them right after a suspect has confessed 
and may psychologically feel like she has already waived those rights.139  
The Court concluded that the appropriate inquiry is whether the 
warnings issued reasonably conveyed to the suspect the rights the 
Constitution guarantees.140  In other words, given the circumstances of 
the interrogation, the determining factor would be whether the warnings 
acted as effectively as Miranda required.141 
                                                                                                             
admitted she knew Donald was meant to die in the fire.  Id.  At this point she was given a 
twenty-minute coffee and cigarette break.  Id.  After this break, Hanrahan gave Seibert the 
Miranda warnings and turned on a tape recorder.  Id.  He then resumed the questioning and 
frequently referred to her pre-warning statements.  Id.  The pertinent language used by 
Officer Hanrahan was “Ok, ‘Trice, we’ve been talking for a little while about what 
happened on Wednesday the twelfth, haven’t we?”  Id.  Also, “Trice, didn’t you tell me that 
he [Donald] was supposed to die . . . ?”  Id.  During the post-Miranda interview Seibert 
confessed again to knowing that Donald was supposed to die in the fire.  Id.  Seibert was 
charged with first-degree murder for her role in Donald’s death.  Id.  At trial Seibert sought 
to exclude both her pre-warning and post warning statements.  Id.  Officer Hanrahan 
admitted that he made a “conscious decision” to withhold Miranda warnings stating that he 
was using an interrogation technique he had been taught: question first, give the warnings, 
and then repeat the question “until I get the answer that she’s already provided once.”  Id. 
136 Id.  Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer joined this opinion, with Justice Breyer 
filing his own concurring opinion.  Id. at 2613.  Justice Kennedy filed his own concurring 
opinion.  Id. at 2614.  Justice O’Connor dissented, and was joined by Chief Justice 
Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Thomas.  Id. at 2616. 
137 Id. at 2609 (“attention must be paid to the conflicting objects of Miranda and question-
first”). 
138 Id.  These practices by police departments are hardly limited to Missouri.  See Clymer, 
supra note 112, at 451 (characterizing intentional violations of Miranda by police as 
“advantageous,” “sensible,” and “constitutional”); see also Charles D. Weisselberg, In the 
Stationhouse After Dickerson, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1121, 1123-25 (2001) (describing various 
California police training instructions for questioning “outside Miranda”). 
139 Seibert, 124 S. Ct. at 2609.  “The object of question-first is to render Miranda warnings 
ineffective by waiting for a particularly opportune time to give them, after the suspect has 
already confessed.”  Id. at 2610. 
140 Id.  “The inquiry is simply whether the warnings reasonably ‘conve[y] to [a suspect] 
his rights as required by Miranda.’”  Id.  (quoting Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195, 203 
(1989)). 
141 Id.  “In a sequential confession case, clarity is served if the later confession is 
approached by asking whether in the circumstances the Miranda warnings given could 
reasonably be found effective.”  Id. at 2610 n.4. 
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Seibert argued that the warned confession should be kept out 
because it was “fruit of the poisonous tree.”142  She claimed this evidence 
was otherwise admissible but discovered as the result of an earlier 
constitutional violation and should be excluded so that the law does not 
encourage future violations.143  But the Court rejected this argument 
based on the holding in Elstad.144  The Court took the position that clarity 
is best served by approaching the second confession from the position 
that if it was possible for the Miranda warnings to be effective, then the 
voluntariness of the confession and waiver could be upheld.145  If not, 
then the confession would be inadmissible for lack of adequate Miranda 
warnings.146 
The factors identified by the Seibert plurality distinguished the 
interrogations involved in Seibert from the interrogation involved in 
Elstad.147  In Elstad, the Court noted that the questioning at the station 
house was a marked difference from the limited questioning that had 
taken place at the suspect’s house.148  Not only was the setting markedly 
different, but new interrogators were used as well.149  Also, the 
statements made at the suspect’s house were never referred to by the 
                                                 
142 Id. 
143 Id.  Seibert based her argument on the Wong Sun Fourth Amendment context.  Id.  See 
supra note 6 and accompanying text for a discussion of Wong Sun and “fruits of the 
poisonous tree.” 
144 Id.  In Elstad, the Court held that any Miranda violation did not so taint the 
proceedings that law enforcement could never gain a valid waiver of the rights.  Oregon v. 
Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 300 (1985).  Rather, the admissibility of any subsequent statement was 
to turn solely on whether it is knowingly and voluntarily made.  Id. 
145 Seibert, 124 S. Ct. at 2610.  The Court identified five factors it used to analyze the 
question-first interrogation.  Id. at 2612.  These factors constitute the approach Justice 
Breyer feels will act, in practice, as a “fruits” approach.  Id. at 2613.  First, the Court looked 
at the completeness and detail of the questions and answers involved in the pre-warning 
interrogation.  Id. at 2612.  Second, it was critical that the content of the pre-warning and 
post-warning interrogations were similar.  Id.  Third, the Court noted the timing and 
setting of the first and second confessions, and fourth the continuity of police personnel 
involved in the interrogations.  Id.  Finally, the Court considered the degree to which the 
interrogator’s questions treated the second round of questioning as continuous with the 
first.  Id. 
146 Id. 
147 Id.  The plurality argues that a “reasonable person in the suspect’s shoes could have 
seen the station house questioning as a new and distinct experience, the Miranda warnings 
could have made sense as presenting a genuine choice whether to follow up on the earlier 
admission.”  Id. 
148 Elstad, 470 U.S. at 315 (noting that the officers stopped in the living room to notify the 
mother of the reasons for the arrest and not to interrogate her son). 
149 Id. at 301.  The settings were the suspect’s home and the stationhouse while the 
interrogators were the arresting officer and a police detective.  Id. 
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interrogator at the station house.150  The Court found that these 
differences would have enabled the suspect to make an informed choice 
about his rights at the station house, rendering the Miranda warnings 
effective in that situation.151 
The Seibert case presented a far different scenario.152  The plurality 
noted that the same interrogator was involved in both interrogations and 
that they took place in the same room at the station house.153  
Additionally, the interrogator also referred back to Seibert’s unwarned 
statements repeatedly during the second interview.154  Further, while not 
proscribing a set length of time between statements for Miranda to be 
effective, the plurality stated that twenty minutes was not long 
enough.155  These factors combined to vitiate the effectiveness of the 
Miranda warnings before the second confession.156  Specifically, the 
plurality stated that the second confession was a mere continuation of 
the unwarned statement and as such was to be excluded.157 
                                                 
150 Id. at 301-02. 
151 Seibert, 124 S. Ct. at 2607, 2612. 
152 Id.  The Court referred to the Seibert scenario as “the opposite extreme.”  Id. 
153 Id. The Court was influenced by the fact that Officer Hanrahan “said nothing to 
counter the probable misimpression that the advice that anything Seibert said could be 
used against her also applied to the details” of the unwarned statement.  Id.  In other 
words, the police never told her that her prior statement could not be used.  Id. 
154 Id.  The Court noted that “any uncertainty on her part about a right to stop talking 
about matters previously discussed would only have been aggravated by the way Officer 
Hanrahan set the scene by saying ‘we’ve been talking for a little while about what 
happened on Wednesday the twelfth, haven’t we?’”  Id. at 2613. 
155 Id.  The length of time, comparatively, in Elstad was over one hour.  Elstad, 470 U.S. at 
301. 
156 Seibert, 124 S. Ct. at 2613. 
157 Id.  Justice Breyer, in his concurrence, stated that he believed the analysis followed by 
the plurality would act as a “fruits” based analysis, similar to the fruits analysis in other 
Fourth Amendment cases.  Id.  (Breyer, J., concurring).  He felt this way despite the express 
rejection of this type of analysis in Elstad, and the plurality in this case.  Id.  Justice Breyer 
argued for a “fruits” analysis because prosecutors and judges understand how to apply the 
approach.  Id.  He also believed that effective Miranda warnings would only occur when 
certain circumstances, such as the plurality’s five factors, intervene to break the connection 
between the two statements.  Id. at 2614; see, e.g., Taylor v. Alabama, 457 U.S. 687, 690 (1982) 
(holding that evidence obtained subsequent to a constitutional violation must be 
suppressed as “fruit of the poisonous tree” unless “intervening events break the causal 
connection”).  He therefore believed that unless the failure to warn was a good faith failure, 
the “fruits” of the unwarned statement should be excluded.  Seibert, 124 S. Ct. at 2613 
(Breyer, J., concurring).  Justice O’Connor took issue with the “fruits” analysis and agreed 
with the plurality’s refusal to apply it.  Id. at 2617 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).  She stated that 
the analysis may involve the same facts and circumstances as a “fruits” analysis would 
consider, but it does so for entirely different reasons.  Id.  The “fruits” analysis seeks to 
balance the probative value of the evidence with the deterrence value of exclusion, while 
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Justice Kennedy filed a concurring opinion, supported by somewhat 
different reasoning.158  He argued that the Court must first determine 
whether the failure to warn was deliberate or unintentional,159 and stated 
that the Elstad decision should continue to be applied unless the failure 
to warn was deliberate.160  The second prong of Justice Kennedy’s 
argument was that in intentional failure to warn cases, curative measures 
should be allowed.161  The curative measures he would allow are very 
similar to the factors that the plurality considered.162  In the alternative, 
Justice Kennedy reasoned, a statement by the interrogator to the suspect 
that the previous interview would most likely be inadmissible could also 
serve as a curative measure and make the subsequent statement 
admissible.163 
                                                                                                             
the plurality uses those factors to determine the psychological affect they had on the 
suspect.  Id. 
158 Seibert, 124 S. Ct. at 2613 (Kennedy, J., concurrence).  His concurrence has been 
criticized as being the “unfortunate byproduct” of the Court’s concern over law 
enforcement’s deliberate withholding of Miranda.  Moreno, supra note 129, at 396. 
159 Moreno, supra note 129, at 396.  However, this is clearly inconsistent with Moran v. 
Burbine, 475 U.S. 412 (1986), which held that thoughts kept inside a police officer’s head 
cannot affect the suspect’s experience.  This would seem to dispel the need for a dichotomy 
between intentional and unintentional violation of Miranda because the suspect would 
have experienced the interrogation in the same manner.  Seibert, 124 S. Ct. at 2618 
(O’Connor, J., dissenting).  This test would also seem to shift an “impossible and 
inappropriate” burden onto the defendant to prove an officer acted in bad faith.  Moreno, 
supra note 129, at 397-98. 
160 Seibert, 124 S. Ct. at 2616 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).  See infra note 171 for Justice 
O’Connor’s criticism of this contention. 
161 Seibert, 124 S. Ct. at 2616 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).  In this matter Justice O’Connor 
agreed with the plurality and disagreed with Justice Kennedy.  Id. at 2618.  She reasoned 
that the Court had previously held that the thoughts occurring in the interviewer’s head 
are irrelevant when it comes to the voluntariness of the suspect’s statement.  See infra note 
172 and accompanying text.  In Burbine, the police were interrogating a suspect while an 
attorney the suspect’s sister had hired for him (without his knowledge) was waiting in the 
lobby.  475 U.S. at 417-18.  The Court held, in an opinion by Justice O’Connor, that the 
police’s failure to inform the suspect about the attorney his sister had hired did not deprive 
him of his right to counsel or vitiate the waiver of Miranda rights.  Id. at 422-23.  The Court 
reasoned that the police activity had “no bearing on the capacity to comprehend and 
knowingly relinquish a constitutional right.”  Id. at 422.  Therefore, according to Justice 
O’Connor dissent in Seibert, Officer Hanrahan’s intent could not impact Seibert’s capacity 
to comprehend and knowingly relinquish her rights.  Seibert, 124 S. Ct. at 2618 (O’Connor, 
J., dissenting).  Additionally, Justice O’Connor noted that it would be frequently difficult, if 
not impossible, to tell what states of mind different interviewers had, and the likelihood of 
error would be high.  Id. 
162 Seibert, 124 S. Ct. at 2618.  Justice Kennedy’s curative measures are a substantial break 
in time or a statement that the pre-warning statement is inadmissible.  Id. 
163 Id.  Justice O’Connor noted that Justice Kennedy’s stated reason for concurring with 
the plurality was that no curative measures were taken in this instance.  Id. 
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Justice O’Connor, in her dissent, would have kept to the “knowingly 
and voluntarily made” test employed in Elstad.164  She reasoned that if 
the first statement was shown to be involuntary, then a court must 
examine whether the taint was dissipated through the passage of time or 
change in scenery.165  The important issue for Justice O’Connor was the 
voluntariness of the second confession.166  Consequently, Justice 
O’Connor would have remanded the case for the Missouri courts to 
consider the voluntariness of Seibert’s second confession.167 
The next step is to analyze the “knock and talk” utilizing the legal 
tests put forth by the Court.  Specifically, Part III takes the judicial tests 
set forth and applies them to the “knock and talk” context. 
III.  IS THE “KNOCK AND TALK” A TOLERABLE INVESTIGATORY TOOL? 
Police engage in constitutional activity when they go to the door of a 
residence and knock on it.168  This proposition has been stated in the 
curtilage and open fields doctrines, pertaining to the area outside of a 
home generally accessible to the public, and is not questioned in this 
Note.  The analysis must begin, therefore, at the point where the 
constitutional activity begins to blur—that is, when the “knock and talk” 
is used to evade the warrant requirement.169  The “knock and talk” 
technique falls under the purview of consent searches.  However, as 
demonstrated above, the development of consent case law was based on 
the development of coerced confession cases.170  Therefore, Part III.A will 
analyze the “knock and talk” using the development of coerced 
confession cases, principally Missouri v. Seibert, because this 
                                                 
164 “The relevant inquiry is whether, in fact, the second statement was also voluntarily 
made.”  Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 318 (1985).  Justice O’Connor opined that it is a rare 
instance when a police officer is so forthcoming regarding his true intentions in 
withholding the Miranda warnings.  Seibert, 124 S. Ct. at 2618 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).  In 
the future, she imagined, it would be difficult, if not impossible, to discern the true 
intention of the officer.  Id. 
165 “When a prior statement is actually coerced, the time that passes between confessions, 
the change in place of interrogations, and the change in identity of the interrogators all bear 
on whether that coercion has carried over into the second confession.”  Elstad, 470 U.S. at 
310.  These are also similar to Justice Kennedy’s curative measures.  See supra note 161. 
166 Seibert, 124 S. Ct. at 2619 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
167 Id. at 2620. 
168 The area outside of the home, open to the public, from the street to the front door is 
covered under the curtilage and open field doctrines.  See supra note 13 for an explanation 
of these doctrines. 
169 See supra note 4 (describing the “knock and talk” as being a method of avoiding the 
requirements of the Fourth Amendment). 
170 See supra notes 96-133 and accompanying text. 
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development was examined in Bustamonte.171  Following that analysis, 
Part III.B will analyze the “knock and talk” using the “totality of all the 
circumstances” test from Bustamonte itself.172  Both analyses will 
demonstrate the questionable constitutionality of the “knock and talk” 
technique that will be addressed in Part IV of this Note.173 
A. Coerced Confession Analysis 
The application of coerced confession case analysis has its roots in 
Supreme Court precedent.174  Coerced confession case history shows that 
the Court is concerned with the psychological advantage that the police 
have over suspects when engaged in interrogation.175  In fact, the Court 
went so far as to say that coercion was a conclusive presumption if 
Miranda warnings were not given.176  However, Bustamonte currently 
governs this point in the search context because the Court explicitly 
ruled that a warning is not required.177   
On the other hand, these differing results seem illogical.  The Fourth 
Amendment is mostly concerned with intrusions into the home.178  If so, 
searching a residence without a warrant and without properly obtained 
consent would represent a constitutional violation invoking the “fruit of 
the poisonous tree” doctrine.179  Conversely, the Court has already ruled 
that a Miranda violation does not in and of itself represent a 
constitutional violation, but can lead to the exclusion of the results of an 
interrogation.180  It then becomes difficult to justify a consent search 
                                                 
171 See infra notes 174-225 and accompanying text. 
172 See infra notes 226-51 and accompanying text. 
173 See infra notes 252-66 and accompanying text. 
174 See supra note 70 and accompanying text (reporting that the Bustamonte Court looked 
to coerced confession cases for definitions of “voluntariness”).  This comparison makes 
sense on many different levels.  See Simmons, supra note 13, at 795.  In both contexts, the 
police are asking the defendant to voluntarily take actions that go against her interests.  Id.  
Additionally, both contexts produce especially compelling evidence against the defendant.  
Id.  Also, these cases frequently occur in cases where law enforcement officers have a 
unique opportunity to use significant amounts of compulsion against the defendant.  Id. 
175 See supra notes 106-08 and accompanying text. 
176 Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 307 (1985).  This presumption is present no matter 
where the interrogation is taking place.  Therefore, the fact that the interrogation might 
take place in a stationhouse, while the “knock and talk” takes place at a residence should 
not be determinative. 
177 See supra note 70 and accompanying text. 
178 See supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
179 See supra note 6 (describing the Wong Sun “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine). 
180 It only represents a constitutional violation when the actual statement is used in court 
against the accused.  Elstad, 470 U.S. at 306.  Therefore, police are free to violate Miranda if 
they do not mind the statement’s admissibility being taken away.  Clymer, supra note 112, 
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without a warning on the one hand, and disallow the results of police 
interrogation on the other, where a warning was not given to the 
suspect.181  Rather than remove Miranda protections, it would seem more 
prudent to enhance the search protection afforded the subject in his 
residence.182 
Proponents of the “knock and talk” could argue that the Bostick and 
Drayton decisions seem to place the “knock and talk” technique within 
the realm of constitutional police actions.  At first glance, the requests in 
each case, on a bus in the middle of the passenger’s journey, being ruled 
reasonable, would seem to indicate that any request in a person’s home 
should be reasonable as well.183  However, if one looks deeper into the 
Bostick and Drayton decisions, it becomes apparent that they compel no 
such interpretation.  First, while both Seibert and the “knock and talk” 
involve police procedures specifically formulated to avoid constitutional 
constraints, Bostick does not.184  As a result of this difference, police 
intentionally avoiding the warrant requirement bring their actions into 
                                                                                                             
at 450.  In fact, it can be argued that this stance encourages the violation of Miranda where a 
confession will make a plea bargain possible when it would not have been absent the 
confession.  Id. at 451 (calling the disregard for Miranda constitutional and sensible). 
181 Both confessions and consent searches involve a suspect agreeing to forego rights 
guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, and both involve the competing concerns of the legitimate 
need for confessions and consent searches in law enforcement and the equally important 
need to eliminate police misconduct.  Simmons, supra note 13, at 795. 
182 This also follows the philosophy regarding the sanctity of the home already 
recognized by the Court.  Justice Jackson summed up this philosophy in Brinegar v. United 
States when he stated that Fourth Amendment freedoms 
are not mere second-class rights but belong in the catalog of 
indispensable freedoms.  Among deprivations of rights, none is so 
effective in cowing a population, crushing the spirit of the individual 
and putting terror in every heart.  Uncontrolled search and seizure is 
one of the first and most effective weapons in the arsenal of every 
arbitrary government. . . . There may be, and I am convinced that there 
are, many unlawful searches of homes and automobiles of innocent 
people which turn up nothing incriminating, in which no arrest is 
made, about which courts do nothing, and about which we never hear.  
Courts can protect the innocent against such invasions indirectly and 
through the medium of excluding evidence obtained against those 
who frequently are guilty. 
338 U.S. 160, 180-81 (1949).  See supra note 13 for further discussion. 
183 This, of course, assumes identical police conduct.  It also assumes that the request will 
be interpreted by the resident as a request and not a command, which is questionable.  See 
SOLAN & TIERSMA, supra note 42, at 39-46. 
184 The use of subjective factors in Bustamonte is misleading; the focus of Fourth 
Amendment analysis is on police action and not the state of mind of the accused.  See 
Simmons, supra note 13, at 774, 779. 
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question in the Seibert and “knock and talk” contexts.185  This difference 
also confers a preference for the Seibert analysis of the “knock and talk” 
being utilized, since both Seibert and the “knock and talk” involve law 
enforcement’s attempt to work around constitutional protections.186  
Second, both Bostick and Drayton have been criticized as being void of 
practical considerations.187  As a result, it could be the time to overrule 
them. 
Further, in keeping with the tenants of the Bustamonte Court, the 
“knock and talk” procedure must also be evaluated under coerced 
confession precedent, and the precedent set forth in the Bustamonte 
ruling itself.188  As a result, Part III.A.1 discusses the Court’s analysis in 
Seibert.189    
1. The Seibert Plurality 
The plurality in Seibert held that the goal of Miranda was to ensure 
police tactics do not overbear the will of the accused.190  The Court then 
noted that the goal of the question-first tactic employed by the police 
was to render Miranda warnings ineffective.191  This aspect of the 
question-first tactic is identical to the “knock and talk.”  The goal in 
using the “knock and talk” is to gain consent to search, and thereby 
alleviate the need for a search warrant.192  But this legal shortcut has the 
                                                 
185 Officers admitted in the Ferrier decision that they conducted the “knock and talk” to 
avoid getting a warrant.  State v. Ferrier, 960 P.2d 927, 932 (Wash. 1998).  Indeed, that is the 
principle advantage to the “knock and talk”—the avoidance of the hassle of getting a 
warrant.  See supra LAFAVE, supra note 5, at 4 (stating police attempt consent searches 
because they believe the warrant requirement to be overly technical and time consuming); 
see also Melton v. State, 705 N.E.2d 564, 568 (Ind. 1999) (Robb., J., concurring) (noting the 
conduct of the police was troubling when conducting a “knock and talk”). 
186 See infra notes 190-211 and accompanying text. 
187 See Simmons, supra note 13, at 773 (noting that the Court’s rulings do not comport 
with real life confrontations occurring on the street); Erica Flores, Note, “People, Not Places”: 
The Fiction of Consent, The Force of Public Interest, and the Fallacy of Objectivity in Police 
Encounters with Passengers During Traffic Stops, 7 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1071, 1081 (2005) (“By 
relying on the illusion that passengers can simply ignore the presence of the police, courts 
approve of the sort of fishing expeditions the Fourth Amendment was designed to 
prevent.”). 
188 See supra notes 68-82 and accompanying text. 
189 See supra notes 134-67 and accompanying text. 
190 Missouri v. Seibert, 124 S. Ct. 2601, 2609 (2004). 
191 Id. 
192 See supra note 185 for examples of police using the “knock and talk” to avoid the 
warrant requirement. 
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effect of rendering the protection of the Fourth Amendment 
ineffective.193 
The plurality went on to describe five factors pertinent to the 
evaluation of the voluntariness of the post-warning statement, and these 
are useful in the “knock and talk” analysis.194  The first two factors noted 
by the Seibert Court were the completeness and detail of the first pre-
warning set of questions, and the similar content of the two sets of 
questions.195  The more detailed and complete those questions were, the 
more it seemed that coercion was present.196  Further, if the content was 
similar, the chance that the suspect would no longer believe he could 
remain silent was increased.  This technique tipped the psychological 
scale too far in the police’s favor.  The Court defined the inappropriate 
behavior by the police as conducting an interrogation without a Miranda 
warning, getting incriminating evidence, and then issuing the warning 
when it will be least effective.197  By corollary, in the context of consent 
searches, the behavior by police should be deemed inappropriate if they 
do not give out information, or if they provide incomplete or deceptive 
information in pursuit of consent.198  
Within the realm of “knock and talk” consent searches, it is often the 
case that the police do not give any explanation for the search, or the 
explanation given is devious.199  By analogy, this deception or lack of 
information relates to the facts of Bumper, when the Court held that 
misrepresentations by the police represented coercion.200  Following the 
                                                 
193 “[P]hysical intrusion into the privacy of a person’s residence absent a warrant is the 
primary evil that the Fourth Amendment seeks to eradicate.”  Hadl v. State, 47 S.W.3d 897, 
902 (Ark. App. 2001) (Griffen, J., concurring).  The effectiveness of Fourth Amendment 
protection is lessoned to a degree if all the police have to do to avoid it is to “bargain” for 
consent. 
194 See Seibert, 124 S. Ct. at 2612. 
195 Id. 
196 See supra note 145. 
197 “The object of question-first is to render Miranda warnings ineffective by waiting for a 
particularly opportune time to give them, after the subject has already confessed.”  Seibert, 
124 S. Ct. at 2610. 
198 This is a primary reason some states have ruled that the “knock and talk” requires 
informed consent; that is, the occupant must be informed of the right to refuse consent.  See 
supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text. 
199 See supra notes 11-13 and accompanying text. 
200 See Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 550 (1968).  This is especially true when 
one considers the evidence that people often do not feel they can refuse a police request.  
See supra note 3 (relating the uncertainty a professor of criminal procedure felt when police 
came to her home to investigate a complaint); supra note 43 (describing the “no sane man 
rule” and questioning why suspects continually grant consent to search with full 
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Bumper Court, the presence of coercion precludes the presence of 
consent.201  At a minimum, the validity of the consent given will be 
called into question in court.202 
Another factor that the Seibert Court found important was the 
location of each set of questioning.203  The Court was persuaded by the 
fact that both sets of questions took place at the station house, as that 
would further indicate to the suspect that she was unable to retract her 
previous statement.204  In this particular context, comparison to the 
“knock and talk” is more difficult; it would be rare that a “knock and 
talk” was conducted at one residence only to have the search take place 
at a second residence.205 
In this regard, the Court has held many times that police questioning 
in the home, absent intimidation, is not coercive, as the suspect will feel 
more at ease in the home setting than in the station house.206  While this 
assertion is most likely true, it runs directly counter to the explicit 
language in the Fourth Amendment regarding protection of the home.207  
On the other hand, the language of the Fourth Amendment provides for 
only protection against unreasonable searches, and that the Court has 
stated consent searches are reasonable.   
However, as a Federal Trade Commission regulation and other 
Court rulings indicate, the mere act of asking for consent inside the home 
is unreasonable.208  Indeed, the Federal Trade Commission has explicitly 
                                                                                                             
knowledge incriminating evidence will be found); supra note 72 (discussing anecdotal 
evidence that people comply with the uniform, not the request). 
201 See Bumper, 391 U.S. at 550. 
202 See, e.g., Simmons, supra note 13, at 774 (stating that no outsider viewing interaction 
would conclude that one would voluntarily consent to search when surrounded by police 
in close quarters). 
203 See Missouri v. Seibert, 124 S. Ct. 2613, 2607 (2004). 
204 See supra notes 153-54 and accompanying text. 
205 On the other hand, it is not totally out of the realm of possibility in the case of a 
neighbor being present when police enter the home.  This, however, is not within the scope 
of this Note. 
206 See supra note 78 and accompanying text. 
207 Physical intrusion into the privacy of the home without a warrant is the chief evil the 
Fourth Amendment seeks to eradicate.  Hadl v. State, 47 S.W.3d 897, 902 (Ark. App. 2001) 
(Griffen, J., concurring). 
208 See supra note 79 and accompanying text.  If the home is truly a sacred place for 
constitutional purposes, it should be protected from police intervention when they do not 
have enough suspicion to get a search warrant.  Otherwise, why would the police ever 
bother to ask for a warrant if they can get consent?  This renders the warrant requirement 
toothless—over 90% of searches are already conducted under the auspices of consent.  See 
supra note 13 and accompanying text. 
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stated, through regulation, that outsiders inside the home are coercive.209  
Similarly, the Court has found the home setting to be worthy of a greater 
level of protection in free speech jurisprudence.210  As both the Federal 
Trade Commission and the Court have found the home worthy of 
increased privacy protection, it becomes logical to extend that privilege 
to the home search setting. 
The last factor that the plurality in Seibert examined was the time 
interval between the pre-warning and post-warning questioning.211  A 
twenty-minute interval, the plurality ruled, did not provide enough of a 
cooling-off period, and in fact, was merely a continuation of the 
unwarned statement.212  Seen in the context of the “knock and talk,” this 
tactic becomes even more intrusive.  There are no warnings given.  The 
police come in, most of the time at night, under the guise of merely 
“discussing” a situation.  This “discussion” quickly turns into a request 
for consent, often before the homeowner has time to completely digest 
what has happened.  If twenty minutes in a station house is not enough 
time for a suspect to gather her senses, then it follows that an 
instantaneous question in the home would not allow this either. 
When the factors used by the Seibert plurality are applied to the 
“knock and talk,” it becomes apparent that the “knock and talk” should 
be categorized with the question-first/Mirandize later interrogation 
tactic.  Both techniques are utilized by law enforcement to evade 
constitutional requirements put in place to secure our freedom. 
2. The Seibert Concurrences 
Both Justice Breyer and Justice Kennedy focused on the police intent 
when writing their concurrences in Seibert.213  Even though their 
positions have been criticized, they nonetheless deserve analysis in the 
                                                 
209 See supra note 80 and accompanying text.  If door-to-door salesmen are so coercive as 
to require a three day cooling-off period, why is the presence of law enforcement not 
considered coercive?  One dresses in plain clothes only armed with his product and 
vocabulary.  The other comes armed with a gun and the ability to take away your freedom 
and liberty.  The finding of coerciveness on the part of salesmen and not on the part of 
police is illogical in this setting. 
210 See supra note 78.  Surely, if residential privacy is to be protected from even one 
picketer, then it should be protected from police activity having even the appearance of 
coerciveness. 
211 Missouri v. Seibert, 124 S. Ct. 2601, 2612 (2004). 
212 Id. at 2613. 
213 See supra note 158 and accompanying text. 
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“knock and talk” context.214  The position of each concurring Justice 
comports with the potential finding that the “knock and talk” is 
presumptively coercive. 
Justice Breyer would have allowed the question-first/Mirandize later 
technique only when the failure to warn was a good faith failure and 
was unintentional, whereas Justice Kennedy took this analysis one step 
further, even allowing the intentional question-first/Mirandize later 
when “curative measures” were employed during the interval between 
the pre-warning and post-warning statements.215  
Both of these analyses are appropriate for the “knock and talk.”  It is 
undisputed that the “knock and talk” is utilized for the direct purpose of 
gaining consent, and therefore avoiding the requirements of the warrant 
requirement.216  It has been argued that requiring a warning, similar to 
Miranda, in the “knock and talk” context would be a curative measure.217  
However, the taint of coerciveness would still surround the written 
warning if other precautions were not in place.218  For one, the Seibert 
Court found the Miranda warnings insufficient in that particular 
context.219  There is no assurance that police will not find a way to 
creatively insert the warning in the search context.220  Because the “knock 
and talk” is an intentional attempt to avoid the warrant requirement, and 
curative measures would not absolve the “taint,” the analysis from the 
concurrences in Seibert results, again, in the “knock and talk” appearing 
to be a coercive police tactic used to gain consent. 
                                                 
214 See Moreno, supra note 129, at 398 (describing the bad faith test, or intentional 
disregard of Miranda, as shifting an impossible and inappropriate burden onto the 
defendant, yet also describing federal courts already using the test). 
215 See supra notes 157, 163 and accompanying text. 
216 Indeed, in most instances, not only do the police seek to avoid the warrant 
requirement, they could not get a warrant even if they wanted one because they lack 
probable cause.  See supra note 4. 
217 See State v. Ferrier, 960 P.2d 927, 933 (Wash. 1998); see also SOLAN & TIERSMA, supra 
note 42, at 51. 
218 For example, did the police use coercive tactics to get the warning signed?  Or, 
alternatively, was the warning signed before the search or after the search in an attempt by 
the accused of mitigating any incriminating evidence found during the search? 
219 Missouri v. Seibert, 124 S. Ct. 2601, 2613 (2004) (“These circumstances must be seen as 
challenging the comprehensibility and efficacy of the Miranda warnings to the point that a 
reasonable person in the suspect’s shoes would not have understood them to convey a 
message that she retained a choice about continuing to talk.”). 
220 As an example, how effective would the warnings be in the case of our hypothetical, 
when the officer is exploiting the suspect’s family situation to gain consent?  What mother 
would reasonably feel free to decline the request, if she feels her custody over her children 
is threatened? 
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3. The Seibert Dissent 
Justice O’Connor’s dissent did not take issue with the factors used by 
the plurality, but rather with the result of the plurality opinion.221  
Specifically, Justice O’Connor would have remanded the case for a 
determination of whether Seibert’s second confession was voluntarily 
given.222  She saved the majority of her disagreement for the 
concurrences, and the discussion of police intent in their analyses.223   
According to Justice O’Connor, the intent of the police has no effect 
on how the accused perceives the questioning.224  By extension, the same 
logic would be used in the “knock and talk” analysis.  The reason that 
police choose to use the technique should have no impact on the finding 
of coerciveness.  Assuming, for the sake of argument this is true, it 
nonetheless could leave the presumption of coerciveness.  The technique 
still takes place in the home, still mostly occurs at night, and still 
involves unsupervised police action.225  Because Justice O’Connor agreed 
with the factors utilized by the plurality, the same analysis used in that 
section applies to the “knock and talk.”  Thus, Justice O’Connor’s 
analysis also comports with the potential finding of presumptive 
coerciveness. 
Utilizing the factors employed in the Seibert ruling, it has been 
shown that the “knock and talk” technique has a dubious constitutional 
basis.  The logic behind all three groupings of Justices—the plurality, the 
concurrences, and the dissent—has been used to show the troubling 
nature of the “knock and talk.”  However, the “knock and talk” also 
needs to be analyzed under the Bustamonte reasoning and using the 
“totality of the circumstances” surrounding the use of the technique. 
B. Totality of the Circumstances Analysis 
The language used by the Court in the Bustamonte decision indicated 
that the totality of the circumstances has to be evaluated on a case-by-
case basis.226  The Court explicitly stated that no one characteristic would 
                                                 
221 See supra note 164 and accompanying text. 
222 Seibert, 124 S. Ct. at 2620. 
223 Id. 
224 Id. 
225 The actions of police in the field are ultimately supervised by judges; a group 
admittedly loathe to find that the police lied.  See supra note 100.  If that is true, the taint of 
coerciveness is still present whether the police intend to use the tactic or not.  This 
argument is thus beside the point. 
226 Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218,  227 (1973). 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 41, No. 3 [2007], Art. 11
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol41/iss3/11
2007] Reining in “Knock and Talk” Investigations 1373 
be outcome-determinative in regards to the coercion question.227  It thus 
becomes somewhat more difficult to analyze a general proposition, such 
as the coerciveness of the “knock and talk,” using case specific 
characteristics.  It can be done, however, using the reasoning in the 
Court’s analysis that was based on the characteristics. 
The Bustamonte Court stated that the totality of the circumstances 
would show the voluntariness of the consent.228  In order to be 
voluntary, the police tactics used to gain the consent must not have 
“overborne the will” of the suspect.229  To apply these principals in a 
general setting entails much of the Seibert argument made above.230  
Police intend to overcome the will of the accused by the very nature of 
the “knock and talk.”  When a police officer negotiates for the consent 
from the accused, he is essentially admitting that the accused would not 
consent under normal circumstances.231  In other words, if the accused 
was going to consent by a free will, no negotiation on the officer’s part 
would be necessary.  Many, including one Supreme Court Justice, 
recognize the inherent difficulty society imposes on individuals if they 
are expected to decline an officer’s request.232  Furthermore, some 
civilians would believe that if they refused the request, it would only 
arouse the officer’s suspicions and intensify the investigation; in fact, 
officers have admitted that investigations are often intensified after a 
refusal.233  This real world result runs counter to the Bostick Court’s 
assumption in their findings of voluntariness.234 
                                                 
227 Id. at 226. 
228 Id. at 227. 
229 Id. at 226. 
230 See supra notes 190-225 and accompanying text. 
231 See supra note 12 (officer describing the warrant process as being tedious and 
explaining that it is easier to obtain consent because he knows he can get that done). 
232 See Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 444-45 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (stating he 
could not understand how the majority could possibly suggest that a bus passenger would 
ever feel free to decline the officer’s search request); see also Simmons, supra note 13, at 800-
01 (noting the most frequent criticism of consent search cases is that the Court is unaware 
of the realities on the street, where anytime an officer requests something, no matter how 
innocently and politely she asks, the civilian feels a large amount of compulsion to 
comply). 
233 See Bostick, 501 U.S. at 447 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (declaring that intimidating shows 
of authority on the part of police results in defendants reasonably believing that refusing 
requests will arouse the officer’s suspicions, and noting that officers have admitted this is 
the result of a refusal). 
234 In the Bostick opinion, the Court noted that an individual may decline an officer’s 
request without fear of prosecution.  Id. at 437 (majority opinion).  Further, the Court has 
consistently ruled that a refusal to cooperate, without more, does not furnish the minimal 
level of justification needed for a seizure.  Id. 
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Additionally, as stated above, the Federal Trade Commission 
requires a three day cooling off period when salesmen invade the home 
to conduct business.235  The regulation specifically calls the cooling off 
period a right of the purchaser.236  It is illogical to require a three day 
cooling off period when a door-to-door salesman negotiates a sale, but 
hold a negotiated consent valid when it occurs in a matter of minutes.237 
Moreover, the Bustamonte Court ruled that the prosecution bore the 
burden of proof regarding the voluntariness issue.238  It seems that, in 
practice, current courts are not holding the prosecution to this burden.  
When the voluntariness of consent comes down to a “shouting match,” it 
is the tendency of courts to favor the law enforcement testimony.239  This 
outcome is often due to the commonly held belief that the accused has a 
large incentive to lie on the stand in an attempt to preserve his liberty.240  
However, law enforcement has an equally great incentive to lie on the 
stand.241  Specifically, the officer has three goals when testifying:  he 
wants to justify his search, preserve the evidence found, especially if that 
evidence is critical to conviction, and maintain his reputation.  As a 
result, the effect of favoring law enforcement is a shift of the burden of 
proof to the accused to prove consent was involuntary—a difficult, if not 
often impossible proposition.242  If the only evidence that the prosecution 
                                                 
235 See supra note 86 for a description of the regulation granting the cooling off period. 
236 16 C.F.R. § 429.1 (2005) (regulation requiring salesperson to notify the occupant of the 
three day cooling off period when sales occur in the home). 
237 Herbert Gaylord, Note, What Good Is the Fourth Amendment?  “Knock and Talk” & 
People v. Frohiep, 19 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 229, 239 (2002). 
238 See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 248-49 (1973). 
239 The phrase “shouting match” comes from the Strauss article.  See supra note 91 and 
accompanying text.  Courts, many times, defer to police determinations.  Flores, supra note 
201, at 1096.  By granting this deference, courts have removed all objectivity from their 
review.  Id. at 1094; see, e.g., United States v. Arizona, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002) (holding that 
the reasonable suspicion standard would allow officers to draw on their own experience 
and specialized training to make inferences from and deductions about the cumulative 
information available to them that might elude an untrained person); United States v. 
Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 686 (1985) (stating that courts “should take care to consider whether 
the police are acting in a swiftly developing situation, and in such cases the court should 
not indulge in unrealistic second-guessing”); United States v. McRae, 81 F.3d 1528, 1534 
(10th Cir. 1996) (“We defer to ‘the ability of a trained law enforcement officer to distinguish 
between innocent and suspicious actions.’” (quoting United States v. Figeroa, 44 F.3d 908, 
912 (10th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1029 (1995))). 
240 See Robert H. Whorf, Consent Searches Following Routine Traffic Stops: The Troubled 
Jurisprudence of a Drug Interdiction Program, 29 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 1, 27 (2001). 
241 See supra note 98 and accompanying text (descriptions of law enforcement officials 
“testilying”). 
242 This is similar, again, to the confession context requiring the accused prove law 
enforcement acted in bad faith.  Moreno, supra note 129, at 398 (calling this requirement 
difficult, if not impossible).  Further, only obvious and egregious police misconduct will 
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has regarding consent is the officer’s word, and his word is contested by 
a coherent witness whose testimony is believable, it does not seem that 
anything has been proven regarding consent.  There is merely the 
“shouting match,” and by accepting the officer’s word over that of the 
other witness, the court is displaying a preference for police testimony.  
However, if the testimony is looked at objectively, that search should be 
ruled a violation of the Fourth Amendment because the prosecution has 
not met its burden of proof due to each party having an incentive to lie.  
Related to this burden of proof argument is a public policy argument 
based on confidence in the judicial system.  In cases where police officers 
are allowed to get away with selective memory or lying on the stand, it 
has the effect of ratification of error by the court.243  Specifically, the court 
is endorsing the unconstitutional behavior of the police, which has the 
derivative effect of eroding society’s confidence in the judicial system.244  
Also, it could have the residual effect of the suspect’s will being 
overborne during the “negotiation” phase.  If a suspect does not believe 
he has a chance of proving coercion in court, he most likely will not even 
attempt to say no.  This could go a long way in explaining why so many 
people willingly grant consent when incriminating evidence is highly 
likely to be found.245  That is, of course, assuming that they were willing 
in the first place. 
Finally, the development of Miranda case law shows a high 
likelihood that the totality analysis will not function as a deterrent to 
police to abstain from unconstitutional behavior.246  Indeed, the Miranda 
warnings were put into effect because the Court felt the totality analysis 
                                                                                                             
lead to a finding of involuntariness.  Strauss, supra note 3, at 225.  Professor Strauss read 
every published consent case over a three-year period and concluded that a suspect’s 
consent is almost always found to be voluntary; only in extreme cases of misconduct is the 
consent found involuntary.  Id.  The conduct found to lead to a finding of involuntariness 
generally was one of four instances: (1) threats to the subject or his family; (2) deprivation 
of necessities; (3) a false assertion that the police had a right to search; or (4) an “unusual or 
extreme show of force.”  Id. at 223. 
243 See supra notes 92-100 and accompanying text (discussing “testilying” and selective 
memory); see also Derrick Augustus Carter, A Restatement of Exceptions to the Preservation of 
Error Requirement in Criminal Cases, 46 KAN L. REV. 947, 979 (1998) (discussing this 
ratification of error in the preservation of errors for appellate review context). 
244 See Simmons, supra note 13, at 775 (noting that the amount of condemnation of the 
Court’s consensual search rulings threatens to undermine the integrity of judicial review of 
police action); Strauss, supra note 3, at 252 (arguing for the abolition of consent searches 
since “the determination of voluntariness is currently confused, misapplied, and based on a 
fiction” which “raises significant concerns about the integrity of the judicial system”). 
245 See supra note 35 and accompanying text. 
246 See supra notes 96-133 and accompanying text. 
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was not doing enough to prevent coercive police tactics.247  Further, the 
totality test caused a myriad of problems in the confession arena, and the 
Court viewed Miranda as a solution to these problems.248  What is not 
clear is why these same issues should not be expected when the totality 
test is used in the search context.  It could be argued that because the 
search takes place in the home, there is a decreased chance for coercive 
behavior due to the fact the accused is in a familiar setting.249  However, 
there is often a greater chance for coercive behavior on the part of police 
in the home.250  Children being present, the lack of videotape evidence, 
and embarrassment from the police presence all serve the officer in 
creating an atmosphere conducive to obtaining consent.  Additionally, 
children in the home give the officer leverage to negotiate for consent.  
Further, audiotape can be turned on and off at the officer’s whim, and 
curious neighbors may prompt many homeowners to grant consent just 
to get the police out of public view.  This loophole should not be 
tolerated by a Constitution that explicitly prohibits unreasonable 
searches of the home without a warrant supported by probable cause.251 
IV.  A CURE FOR THE “KNOCK AND TALK” 
The previous analysis shows significant problems with the “knock 
and talk” technique as currently employed.  However, it is conceded that 
consent searches and interviews in the home are necessary techniques 
for law enforcement’s use.  As a result, these two concurrent situations 
require a nuanced rule recognizing the police necessity on the one hand, 
and Fourth Amendment protections on the other.252  It is not desirable to 
completely eliminate an effective and commonly used law enforcement 
tool.  However, it is extremely desirable to eliminate those instances 
                                                 
247 See supra note 106 and accompanying text.  Additionally, the Court in Seibert 
recognized that the Miranda warnings themselves were not a sufficient deterrent to police 
misconduct.  Moreno, supra note 129, at 399. 
248 See supra note 108 and accompanying text. 
249 Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 247 (1973) (holding the home is not an 
inherently coercive setting). 
250  [T]he Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments require that a consent not 
be coerced, by explicit or implicit means, by implied threat or covert 
force.  For, no matter how subtly the coercion was applied, the 
resulting ‘consent’ would be no more than a pretext for the unjustified 
police intrusion against which the Fourth Amendment is directed. 
Id. at 228 (citing Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 635 (1886)). 
251 See supra note 16; see also United States v. Lewis, 728 F. Supp. 784, 789 (D.D.C. 1990) 
(“In this ‘anything goes’ war on drugs, random knocks on the doors of our citizens’ homes 
seeking ‘consent’ to search for drugs cannot be far away.  This is not America.”).  As has 
been shown, we are already there. 
252 Simmons, supra note 13, at 788. 
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where the officer could develop probable cause and obtain a search 
warrant but merely chooses not to.253   
In other words, society has an interest in eliminating police 
misconduct.  This desire can be met in a relatively easy fashion with the 
following proposed revised judicial test for consent searches in the home 
resulting from “knock and talks.”  The revised judicial test should 
contain a presumption of coerciveness on the part of police when they 
engage in a “knock and talk.”  This will ensure that the burden of proof 
remains on the prosecution, will protect residents against coercive police 
behavior, and relieve the pressure on the judiciary to prefer police 
testimony over the suspect’s. 
Additionally, this presumption should not present too great a 
burden on the prosecution.  Similar to the preference for videotaping in 
the Miranda context, there should be a preference for videotaping the 
consent search when it results from the “knock and talk.”  The main 
benefit is that videotaping will allow the reviewing judge to observe the 
totality of the circumstances.  The circumstances surrounding the search 
can be viewed directly by the judge instead of relying on testimony to 
determine the totality of the circumstances.  Further, the videotape 
protects the police themselves from spurious accusations of coercion.   
A. Presumption of Coerciveness 
The first element of the proposed solution is a new judicial test.  The 
sanctity of the home in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence dictates that 
these “knock and talk” searches should carry a presumption of 
coerciveness.  This presumption would provide three important benefits.  
First, the presumption will recognize the importance society places on 
the privacy of the home.  Second, the presumption will ensure that the 
burden of proof remains on the prosecution to prove voluntariness, or 
reasonable police action.  Third, the presumption will, in part, increase 
the public’s confidence in the judicial system. 
Currently, the Supreme Court, in various contexts, recognizes that a 
warrantless search inside the home is the chief evil the Fourth 
Amendment was designed to protect.254  This solicitude comes from the 
language of the Fourth Amendment itself which specifically guards the 
“right of the people to be secure in their . . . houses . . . against 
                                                 
253 Strauss, supra note 3, at 264-65. 
254 See supra notes 14, 43 and accompanying text. 
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unreasonable searches and seizures.”255  Alternatively, the Court has also 
stated that the home provides familiar surroundings enabling the 
accused to feel free to end the police encounter.256  These differing 
positions require reconciliation that the presumption of coercion can 
provide.  The point of the presumption is not that civilians can end the 
encounter; it is that on some level they should not have to.  The fact that 
the search takes place in the home should receive heightened scrutiny if, 
indeed, the privacy of the home deserves special Fourth Amendment 
treatment.  Additionally, the presumption of coerciveness will refocus 
courts onto the protection of privacy the home deserves. 
Moreover, the presumption of coerciveness will ensure that the 
burden of proof remains on the prosecution.257  Courts must require 
more than a police officer’s testimony that consent was obtained 
reasonably.  If the officer’s testimony is not contradicted by the accused, 
then the presumption has been overcome.  However, if believable 
testimony has been offered by the accused opposing the officer’s 
testimony, then the presumption has not been overcome.  The 
prosecution must provide additional evidence to support the contention 
that the search was consented to, which, in turn, ensures that the burden 
remains on the prosecution. 
Another identified issue that the presumption of coerciveness will 
address is the tendency of courts to grant too much deference to the 
testimony of a law enforcement officer.258  The presumption will 
decrease the incentive for “testilying” by requiring the prosecution to 
provide additional proof, and not merely relying on the officer’s 
testimony.259  Furthermore, the presumption will decrease the effect 
selective memory plays in the courtroom.  This benefit will, in turn, 
increase society’s confidence in the criminal justice system by leveling 
the playing field inside of the courtroom.  Civilian testimony being 
treated equally with law enforcement testimony will engender a sense of 
equality that increases trustworthiness and confidence in the result of 
criminal trials. 
                                                 
255 U.S. CONST. amend. IV; Leonetti, supra note 4, at 297. 
256 This statement is a combination of statements the Court has made in the Bustamonte, 
Bostick, and Drayton cases.  See supra notes 67-95 and accompanying text. 
257 See supra notes 67-79 and accompanying text for the discussion of the burden of proof 
for consent. 
258 See supra notes 88-95 and accompanying text. 
259 See supra notes 92-93 and accompanying text. 
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Additionally, the presumption of coerciveness will give more bite to 
the “free to end the encounter” test put forth in Bostick and Drayton.260  
The feeling of being treated equally in the courtroom and the resulting 
confidence gain in the criminal justice system that the presumption 
engenders will also allow civilians to feel more comfortable declining 
police requests for consent to search.  In this way, people will actually 
feel free to end the encounter because they will have confidence that they 
have a chance to compete equally in the courtroom, the ultimate review 
of police behavior.  This change will address the most frequent criticism 
of consent cases:  the Court’s interpretation of reality does not comport 
with the reality on the streets.261 
B. Meeting the Presumption:  Videotaping the Encounter 
While the presumption of coerciveness provides many corrections to 
the problems encountered by the use of the “knock and talk” technique, 
the prosecution needs reasonable means to overcome the presumption.  
Therefore, to overcome the presumption of coerciveness, the police 
should videotape the “knock and talk” encounter. 
The main benefit of videotape evidence is that it eliminates the 
“shouting match” in the courtroom.262  The judge, or jury, has the 
evidence on display right in front of them, and can decide how coercive 
the police action was using the best available information.  While the 
presumption itself can reduce the incentive for law enforcement to lie on 
the stand, videotape evidence would eliminate it completely.  Therefore, 
instead of trying to decide who is more believable between the officer 
and the accused, the judge can focus on what actually prompted the 
consent to search.  The best method to ensure the consent was granted 
voluntarily, without police coercion, and in a reasonable manner, is for 
the encounter to be videotaped by the police.263  This, of course, requires 
that the video camera be turned on before entering the home and be kept 
on during the search itself.264 
                                                 
260 See supra notes 84-87 and accompanying text for the explanation and discussion of the 
“free to end the encounter” test. 
261 See supra note 250 and accompanying text. 
262 See supra note 92 and accompanying text. 
263 See Moreno, supra note 129, at 399 (arguing that videotaping is the best method to 
ensure custodial interrogations include Miranda warnings, and are free from coercion). 
264 Otherwise, Miranda type problems could ensue.  See supra notes 134-67 and 
accompanying text for a description of the Seibert situation, one type of Miranda problem.  
Also, if the video camera is turned on and off intermittently throughout the search the 
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Furthermore, one reason Miranda warnings have gained a greater 
level of societal confidence is that they are often videotaped.265  The 
videotape allows the presiding judge to view body language, subtle 
innuendos, facial expressions, and tone of voice in reviewing the totality 
of the circumstances surrounding a confession.  This review has the 
effect of increasing confidence in judicial decisions, and by derivative, 
increasing confidence in the criminal justice system itself.  The effect 
would be similar on the “knock and talk” technique if videotape 
evidence was offered.  The videotape would help reduce police 
misconduct, improve the process of the “knock and talk,” and enhance 
the judicial decision-making process.  Shouting matches, as well as 
“testilying” and misremembering by the police, would be eliminated by 
the representative nature of the videotape evidence. 
Lastly, the videotape would protect officers themselves from 
spurious claims of police misconduct.  The videotape would exonerate 
the honest officer who has been wrongly accused of coercive behavior.  
Again, the actions are recorded for posterity and show just what the 
officer did and did not do.  Similar to placing video cameras in squad 
cars to videotape the actions of people pulled over for traffic violations, 
the videotape will show the actions of the civilians inside of the home 
and not allow a claim of misconduct where there was none. 
However, in certain instances, the fact that the police are videotaping 
could actually increase the coerciveness of the situation if the resident 
feels apprehension at being subjected to a recording device.  This feeling 
in some residents would seem to argue against videotaping; however, on 
balance, the benefits outweigh this limited detraction.  First, the video 
camera that this Note proposes is a button camera that would not be 
visible to the occupant.266  Second, the protection to Fourth Amendment 
rights afforded by the use of videotape is a greater benefit to society than 
the limited increase in coercion some may feel when they see the video 
camera, if one is seen at all. 
                                                                                                             
value of the videotape evidence is lost because the judge is then dependant on testimony 
only for descriptions of what occurred while the camera was off. 
265 See supra note 95 and accompanying text.  Also, one could foresee another argument 
against videotaping—the cost of acquiring the equipment.  The response to that argument 
is that many times the equipment is already in squad cars for the protection of officers.  
Another answer is that the cost is not significant.  For less than $300, a button-hole video 
camera could be installed on officers attempting the “knock and talk.”  See 
http://www.cornerstonesecurityservices.com/st163.htm (last visited Jan. 8, 2007) (Web 
site selling covert video cameras). 
266 See supra note 265 for the description of this camera. 
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In summary, the presumption of coerciveness coupled with 
videotape evidence will allow a valued and efficient police procedure to 
continue and flourish.  Confidence in the criminal justice system will be 
increased, which should result in improved relations and cooperation 
between law enforcement and civilians.  Also, police conduct will be 
preserved for judicial review which will protect police departments from 
spurious misconduct claims. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
As the “knock and talk” is currently interpreted by most states, our 
hypothetical mother in the introduction will most likely have to live with 
her consent to the search.  The police will be allowed to get away with 
conduct generally prohibited by the courts when they “bargained” for 
the consent granted.  Even if the mother protests the methods used by 
police, the officers could very well testify that she gave consent willingly 
and produce the signed consent form as proof.  Most judges would be 
persuaded by this evidence that the consent was voluntary and the 
search reasonable. 
As analyzed in this Note, however, the “knock and talk” has features 
that render it unconstitutional as currently employed by the police.  The 
“knock and talk” erodes the sanctity of the home by allowing the police 
admittance to the home using deception, and use the coerciveness of 
their presence in the home to gain consent.  Additionally, and too 
frequently, the courts subtly shift the burden of proof to the accused to 
show coerciveness on the officer’s part rather than hold the prosecution 
to their duty of showing the consent was properly obtained.  This is 
principally, and most often, an unintentional result of judges being 
loathe to finding that a police officer has lied on the stand when 
recounting the circumstances surrounding the search.  The resulting 
“shouting matches” in the courtroom almost always result in victory for 
the police.  
Further, this Note has shown that the tactics employed by law 
enforcement in the “knock and talk” are not reasonable, and need reining 
in.  The privacy and sanctity of the home must be protected, and the 
presumption of coercion and videotaping of home consent searches will 
accomplish this goal.  The “knock and talk” is a tool the police use to 
fight the war on drugs; however, this war should not support the 
violation of the Constitution.  The Court has said, “[i]f that war is to be 
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fought, those who fight it must respect the rights of individuals, whether 
or not those individuals are suspected of having committed a crime.”267 
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